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Article 
Adaptive Management in the Courts 
J.B. Ruhl† and Robert L. Fischman†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Adaptive management has become the tonic of natural re-
sources policy. With its core idea of “learning while doing,”1 
adaptive management has breathed life and hope into a policy 
realm beset by controversy, uncertainty, and complexity. It of-
fers what many believe is needed most in a world bombarded 
by ecological deterioration of massive scales—expert agencies 
exercising professional judgment through an iterative deci-
sionmaking process emphasizing definition of goals, description 
of policy decision models, active experimentation with monitor-
ing of conditions, and adjustment of implementation decisions 
as suggested by performance results. This ideal has become in-
fused into the natural resources policy world to the point of 
ubiquity, surfacing in everything from mundane agency per-
 
†  Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, Florida State University 
College of Law.  
†† Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. The au-
thors are grateful for the research support of the Florida State University Col-
lege of Law and Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Suggestions from 
Mary Jane Angelo, Alex Camacho, Holly Doremus, Forrest Fleischman, Daniel 
Schramm, and Sandi Zellmer corrected errors and improved our analysis. The 
authors thank Jennifer Morgan from the Indiana University Law Library, and 
students Abigail Dean, Lindsey Hemly, Andrew Hoek, Angela King, and Jer-
emiah Williamson for research assistance. Please direct comments and ques-
tions to jruhl@law.fsu.edu or rfischma@indiana.edu. Copyright © 2010 by J.B. 
Ruhl and Robert L. Fischman. 
 1. Professor Holly Doremus explains: 
[A]ctive learning is rarely incorporated into the resource management 
process. For iterative or related decisions, where there is no “safe” 
choice, precaution and science are not in tension. Both point us to-
ward an incremental framework for decision making that emphasizes 
learning. We might call that framework adaptive management, but 
. . . I prefer the more descriptive phrase “learning while doing.” 
Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Re-
source Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 550 (2007). For more detail on 
what “learning while doing” entails, see infra Part I. 
  
2010] ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 425 
 
mits2 to grand presidential proclamations.3 Indeed, it is no ex-
aggeration to suggest that these days adaptive management is 
natural resources policy.  
But is it working? Does appending “adaptive” in front of 
“management” somehow make natural resources policy, which 
has always been about balancing competing claims to nature’s 
bounty, something more and better? Many legal and policy 
scholars have asked that question, with mixed reviews.4 Their 
 
 2. For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has proclaimed 
it will use adaptive management in administering habitat conservation plan 
(HCP) permits it issues pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). This 
will be done as a means to “examine alternative strategies for meeting meas-
urable biological goals and objectives through research and/or monitoring, and 
then, if necessary, to adjust future conservation management actions accord-
ing to what is learned.” Final Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning 
and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,485, 11,486 (Mar. 9, 
1999). As one FWS official explained:  
We will continue to incorporate contingency planning within all types of 
HCPs. In the future, HCPs will have improved structure in their adap-
tive management strategies . . . . Increased structure in adaptive man-
agement strategies will require increased vigilance on the part of per-
mittees and the Service during implementation of long-term plans; this 
reflects the nature of the conservation partnership created by HCPs. 
Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, 25 ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL. 4, 
7 (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,099, 23,101–03 (May 
12, 2009) (directing the EPA to draft pollution-control strategies for the Ches-
apeake Bay watershed that are “based on sound science and reflect adaptive 
management principles,” while also directing the Departments of the Interior 
and Commerce to use “adaptive management to plan, monitor, evaluate, and ad-
just environmental management actions” in the Chesapeake Bay watershed). 
 4. See Mary Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adap-
tive Law and Ecological Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 950, 951–52 (2009) (detail-
ing the theory of adaptive management through a case study based in Flori-
da); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a 
Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 294–99 (2007) (cri-
tiquing the use of adaptive management in the ESA); Holly Doremus, Adap-
tive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Chal-
lenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 50–52 
(2001) (identifying challenges for adaptive management in the administration 
of the ESA); Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked 
to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Manage-
ment, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 871 (2009) (proposing the broad use of adaptive 
management in public land management); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy 
and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 59, 70–71 (2005) (examining the theory of active adaptive manage-
ment); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 21, 33–34 (2005) (identifying disconnects between 
adaptive management and conventional administrative procedure); Annecoos 
Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in 
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1239 (2008) 
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evaluations, however, have rested on theory,5 program-specific 
surveys,6 and focused case studies.7 No study has comprehen-
sively explored and extracted lessons from what likely matters 
significantly to the natural resource agencies practicing adap-
tive management—how is it faring in the courts? We do so in 
this Article. 
Part I of this Article examines the theory, policy, and prac-
tice of adaptive management, focusing on the experience of the 
federal resource management agencies. From theory to policy 
to practice, at each step forward in the emergence of adaptive 
management something has been lost in the translation. The 
end product is something we call “a/m-lite,”8 a watered-down 
version of the theory that resembles ad hoc contingency plan-
ning more than it does planned “learning while doing.” This 
gap between theory and practice leads to profound disparities 
between how agencies justify decisions and how adaptive man-
agement in practice arrives at the courthouse doorsteps.  
 
(arguing that adaptive management by agencies pays insufficient attention to 
substantive goals). 
 5. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 69–74 (examining the theories 
of passive and active adaptive management). 
 6. The use of adaptive management to implement ESA programs has re-
ceived considerable attention. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 4, at 293; Dore-
mus, supra note 4, at 50–52; J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Serious-
ly: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250–51 
(2004). 
 7. See, e.g., Angelo, supra note 4, at 966–90 (Lake Apopka in Florida); 
Melinda Harm Benson, Adaptive Management by Resource Management Agen-
cies in the United States: Implications for Energy Development in the Interior 
West, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 87, 92–95 (2010) (Bureau of Land 
Management energy development on federal public lands in Wyoming); Melin-
da Harm Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas Devel-
opment: Existing Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,962, at 10,962 (2009) (oil and gas development in Wyoming); Alejandro Es-
teban Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management 
from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 944–49 (2008) (Glen 
Canyon Dam adaptive management project); John H. Davidson & Thomas 
Earl Geu, The Missouri River and Adaptive Management: Protecting Ecologi-
cal Function and Legal Process, 80 NEB. L. REV. 816, 820–33 (2001) (Missouri 
River); Alfred R. Light, Tales of the Tamiami Trail: Implementing Adaptive 
Management in Everglades Restoration, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 59, 69–89 
(2006) (Florida Everglades); Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning 
and Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 1, 7–23 (2010) (Glen Canyon Dam adaptive management project). 
 8. “a/m-lite” is a stripped-down version of adaptive management that of-
ten fails due to management, implementation, and planning problems. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 69–70. 
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In Part II, we review how these disparities have played out 
in courts. We consider claims that agency practice of adaptive 
management has not lived up to either its theoretical promise 
or to the legal demands of substantive and procedural law. Our 
overall assessment is that, although courts genuinely and often 
enthusiastically endorse adaptive management theoretically, 
they frequently are underwhelmed by how agencies implement 
adaptive management in the field. We extract three key themes 
from the body of case law in this respect: (1) larger-scale plans 
are more likely to incorporate adaptive management plans that 
withstand judicial scrutiny than are smaller-scale ones; (2) the 
practice of tiering site-specific environmental impact analyses 
to an earlier, overarching, cumulative study is well suited to 
adaptive management, and adaptive management can reduce 
the need for supplemental analyses; and (3) adaptive manage-
ment procedures, no matter how finely crafted, cannot substi-
tute for showing that a plan will meet substantive management 
criteria required by law.  
The pool of judicial opinions on adaptive management is 
still limited in scope, leaving many questions unanswered and 
providing only a partial playbook for how agencies should move 
forward. In Part III, therefore, we extend from the existing case 
law to draw lessons for both Congress and agencies about the 
future practice of adaptive management. The message for Con-
gress is straightforward—provide more funding and clearer 
standards. With neither option likely in the foreseeable future, 
agencies cannot as a practical matter hope to practice a fully 
realized version of adaptive management theory. Our message 
to agencies, however, is that even compromised adaptive man-
agement, in the form of a/m-lite, can be an effective decision 
method—and one that survives judicial scrutiny. But, in order 
for that to be the case, agencies must be more disciplined about 
its design and implementation. This includes resisting the 
temptation to employ adaptive management to dodge burden-
some procedural requirements, committing to substantive 
management criteria, and engaging contentious stakeholder 
participation. 
I.  THE THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE OF ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT   
Adaptive management has moved amazingly fast from 
theoretical drawing board to policy marketing plan to practice 
production line. Along the way, however, it has been watered 
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down to a weak lemonade of ad hoc contingency planning. 
Adaptive management as practiced by the federal resource 
management agencies just does not seem to have quite the 
same refreshing appeal as adaptive management in theory. In 
this Part of the Article, we explore this gap and identify the 
tensions it poses for adaptive management in the courts.9  
A. THEORY 
Over the past two decades, natural resources policy has 
gravitated to a model of nested, ever-changing, complex ecosys-
tems, the essence of which demands a management policy 
framework every bit as dynamic as the ecosystems it seeks to 
manage.10 This rapidly solidifying framework, known as ecosys-
tem management, focuses on natural resources as ecologically 
functioning landscape units rather than as disassembled 
parts—the trees, the water, the grassland, the species, and so 
on.11 To achieve this goal, ecosystem management intends to 
move decisionmaking from a process of setting rigid standards 
based on comprehensive rational planning to one of experimen-
tation using continuous monitoring, assessment, and recalibra-
tion. The dominant of these new decision methods emerged in 
 
 9. This Part builds on themes developed in J.B. Ruhl, Adaptive Man-
agement for Natural Resources—Inevitable, Impossible, or Both?, 54 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11-1, 11-2 (2008). 
 10. The development of natural resources law has taken many of its cues 
from environmental and ecological sciences, which themselves have evolved 
over time. See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecologi-
cal Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 
847–54 (1994). With ecology in particular, the trend over the past half-century 
has been increasingly to focus on the complex flux qualities of ecosystems and 
to place less emphasis on conceptions of stasis and natural stability. See Reed 
F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to Environ-
mental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994) (“Among the new para-
digms in ecology, none is more revolutionary than the idea that nature is not 
delicately balanced in equilibrium, but rather is dynamic, often unpredictable, 
and perhaps even chaotic.”); see also Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and 
Creativity: The New Ecology and Some Old Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 49, 49 (1996); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: 
Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 326–27 (1995). 
 11. For the seminal works developing ecosystem management theory and 
policy, see Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society 
of America on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 665, 665–66 (1996), and R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosys-
tem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 27 (1994). The legal con-
tours of ecosystem management are comprehensively explored in JOHN 
COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM 
MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 2006). 
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the theory of adaptive management C.S. “Buzz” Holling and his 
co-authors laid out in the influential book from the late 1970s, 
Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management.12 
Holling and his fellow researchers found conventional en-
vironmental management methods, particularly the environ-
mental impact analysis process that lies at the core of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),13 at odds with the 
emerging model of ecosystem dynamics. They focused on the 
basic properties of ecological systems to provide the premises of 
a new assessment and management method.14 Under a dynam-
ic model of ecosystems, they concluded, management policy 
must put a premium on collecting information, establishing 
measurements of success, monitoring outcomes, using new in-
formation to adjust existing approaches, and a willingness to 
change.15 The traditional management approach of natural re-
sources policy was “to attack environmental stressors in piece-
meal fashion, one at a time,” and to parcel decisionmaking “out 
among a variety of mission-specific agencies and resource-
specific management regimes.”16 In contrast, the adaptive 
management framework is more evolutionary and interdisci-
plinary, relying on iterative cycles of goal determination, model 
building, performance standard setting, outcome monitoring, 
and standard recalibration. Indeed, advanced versions of adap-
tive management incorporate an experimentalist research ele-
ment, in which management actions deliberately probe for in-
formation to evaluate testable hypotheses about the effects of 
active intervention in ecological processes, such as evaluating 
the effects a chosen habitat management action and its alter-
natives might have on invasive species by running small-scale 
test plot experiments.17  
Adaptive management has evolved well beyond an idea. 
Indeed, from the earliest emergence of ecosystem management 
 
 12. C.S. HOLLING ET AL., ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Restora-
tion Under the Northwest Power Act: Adaptive Management: Learning from the 
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 
(1986) (tracing the term “adaptive management” to Holling’s book).  
 13. NEPA is explored in more detail supra Part III. 
 14. HOLLING ET AL., supra note 12, at 25–37. 
 15. Id. at 1–21. 
 16. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Informa-
tion Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (2008). 
 17. See CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE 
RESOURCES 232 (1986); Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 70–71. 
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policy, there has been broad consensus among resource manag-
ers and academics that adaptive management is the only prac-
tical way to implement ecosystem management.18 Recently, for 
example, the National Research Council branch of the National 
Academy of Sciences convened a committee of scientists to ex-
plore how adaptive management might be used to improve re-
source agency decisionmaking for ecosystem management in 
the Klamath River Basin, which straddles southern Oregon 
and northern California.19 The basin had been beset for decades 
with water management conflicts pitting farming, fishing, tri-
bal, recreational, and species interests in constant battle.20 Not-
ing there had been “little effort to implement adaptive-
management strategies in the Klamath basin,”21 the committee 
synthesized the theoretical formulations to date to outline eight 
key steps of adaptive management: (1) definition of the prob-
lem, (2) determination of goals and objectives for management 
of ecosystems, (3) determination of the ecosystem baseline, (4) 
development of conceptual models, (5) selection of future resto-
ration actions, (6) implementation and management actions, (7) 
monitoring and ecosystem response, and (8) evaluation of resto-
ration efforts and proposals for remedial actions.22 The commit-
tee’s description of the last stage provides some flavor of how 
adaptive management differs from conventional natural re-
sources management in the way Holling and his fellow re-
searchers deemed most important: 
After implementation of specific restoration activities and procedures, 
the status of the ecosystem is regularly and systematically reassessed 
and described. Comparison of the new state with the baseline state is 
a measure of progress toward objectives. The evaluation process feeds 
directly into adaptive management by informing the implementation 
 
 18. See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practice-Based Approach to 
Ecosystem Management, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48, 56 (1997); Anne E. 
Heissenbuttel, Ecosystem Management–Principles for Practical Application, 6 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 730, 732 (1996); Paul L. Ringold et al., Adaptive 
Management Design for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 
745, 745–46 (1996). Indeed, the Ecological Society of America’s comprehensive 
study of ecosystem management treats the use of adaptive management meth-
ods as a given. See Christensen et al., supra note 11, at 670.  
 19. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH 
RIVER BASIN, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER 
BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY 1–3 (2004). In the 
interests of full disclosure, Professor Ruhl served on the so-called Klamath 
Committee. 
 20. See id. at 17–45. 
 21. Id. at 335. 
 22. See id. at 332–35.  
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team and leading to testing of management hypotheses, new simula-
tions, and proposals for adjustments in management experiments or 
development of wholly new experiments or management strategies.23 
By contrast, the committee observed that “[e]cosystem 
management in the Klamath basin typically has pursued the 
widely recognized alternatives to adaptive management: de-
ferred action and trial and error involving crisis manage-
ment.”24 These approaches magnify losses to resources, under-
value information, and overvalue action for action’s sake.25 
While an adaptive management approach would need to adhere 
to legal constraints of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and 
established water rights, the committee identified a number of 
management innovations that could take pressure off the water 
management conflicts, such as water banks and reoriented 
agency management structures and processes.26 
B. POLICY 
Federal resource management agencies have had difficulty 
translating the theoretical descriptions of adaptive manage-
ment into policy. Rather than elaborating on the theoretical 
framework by providing details for implementation of the eight 
steps of adaptive management, agencies adopting adaptive 
management have gone in the reverse direction, condensing the 
policy of adaptive management into the bumper-sticker sized 
slogan of “learning while doing.”27  
For example, one of the first movers on adaptive manage-
ment, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), has employed 
this definition of adaptive management in its policy guidance 
for the ESA permit program since 2000: 
Adaptive management is an integrated method for addressing uncer-
tainty in natural resource management. It also refers to a structured 
process for learning by doing . . . . Passive adaptation is where infor-
mation obtained is used to determine a single best course of action. 
Active adaptation is developing and testing a range of alternative 
strategies. The Services believe that both of these types of adaptive 
management are appropriate to consider when developing a strategy 
to address uncertainty. Therefore, we are defining adaptive manage-
 
 23. Id. at 335.  
 24. Id. at 336. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 340–43. For a thorough history of the basic controversy in 
the Klamath basin dispute, including the impact and aftermath of the Com-
mittee report, see HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE 
KLAMATH BASIN (2008). 
 27. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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ment broadly as a method for examining alternative strategies for 
meeting measurable biological goals and objectives, and then, if nec-
essary, adjusting future conservation management actions according 
to what is learned.28 
Similarly, the Department of the Interior (DOI), in its 
Adaptive Management Technical Guide, defines adaptive man-
agement using a long-winded version of the “learning while 
doing” theme adopted from the National Research Council: 
Adaptive management [is a decision process that] promotes flexible 
decision making that can be adjusted in the face of uncertainties as 
outcomes from management actions and other events become better 
understood. Careful monitoring of these outcomes both advances 
scientific understanding and helps adjust policies or operations as 
part of an iterative learning process . . . . It is not a “trial and error” 
process, but rather emphasizes learning while doing.29 
The mantras of “learning while doing” and “learning by 
doing” may capture the essence of adaptive management, but 
these phrases hardly convey how to do it. The picture gets no 
clearer as one moves from policy guidance to formal regulatory 
definitions. For example, the joint regulation for compensatory 
wetland mitigation—promulgated in April of 2008 by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)30—defines adaptive management as 
the development of a management strategy that anticipates likely 
challenges associated with compensatory mitigation projects and pro-
vides for the implementation of actions to address those challenges, 
as well as unforeseen changes to those projects. It requires considera-
tion of the risk, uncertainty, and dynamic nature of compensatory 
mitigation projects and guides modification of those projects to opti-
mize performance. It includes the selection of appropriate measures 
that will ensure that the aquatic resource functions are provided and 
involves analysis of monitoring results to identify potential problems 
of a compensatory mitigation project and the identification and im-
plementation of measures to rectify those problems.31 
The U.S. Forest Service’s 2008 rule on national forest 
planning,32 which drips with references to adaptive manage-
ment, provides even less definitional detail: 
 
 28. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habi-
tat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000) (internal citations omitted). 
 29. BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE, at v (2009). 
 30. See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008). 
 31. 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (2009). 
 32. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg. 
21,468 (Apr. 21, 2008). 
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Adaptive management: A system of management practices based on 
clearly identified outcomes and monitoring to determine if manage-
ment actions are meeting desired outcomes; and, if not, to facilitate 
management changes that will best ensure that outcomes are met or 
re-evaluated. Adaptive management stems from the recognition that 
knowledge about natural resource systems is sometimes uncertain.33  
The point is that these and other legal definitions of adap-
tive management have done little to pin down what makes 
natural resources management “adaptive” for purposes of  
measuring and evaluating agency decisions. Further content is 
not generally supplied in agency substantive and procedural 
regulations. For example, section 404 of the new Clean Water 
Act’s wetland compensatory mitigation program regulations re-
quires applicants to develop adaptive management plans as 
part of a larger, permitting process and use it to guide deci-
sionmaking over relevant permit time frames.34 Thus, among 
 
 33. 36 C.F.R. § 219.16 (2009) (emphasis removed). This rule is currently 
enjoined by Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 632 
F. Supp. 2d 968, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2009), and the Forest Service has requested 
public input on what direction the planning rule should take. See National For-
est System Land Management Planning, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,165, 67,166 (Dec. 18, 
2009). The Forest Service adopted the same definition in its August 2007 pro-
posed rules updating its procedures for NEPA compliance. See National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act Procedures, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,998, 46,003 (Aug. 16, 2007). 
States do little better. California defines adaptive management, in the context 
of wildlife conservation planning, as “us[ing] the results of new information 
gathered through the monitoring program of the plan and from other sources 
to adjust management strategies and practices to assist in providing for the 
conservation of covered species.” CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2805(a) (West 
2010). A Minnesota statute implementing the Great Lakes compact defines it 
as “a water resources management system that provides a systematic process 
for evaluation, monitoring and learning from the outcomes of operational pro-
grams and adjustment of policies, plans and programs based on experience 
and the evolution of scientific knowledge concerning water resources and wa-
ter dependent natural resources.” MINN. STAT. § 103G.801(1.2) (2010). Adap-
tive management in Oregon means “applying management or practices over 
time and across the landscape to achieve site specific resource goals using an 
integrated and science based approach that results in changes over time in re-
sponse to feedback or monitoring.” OR. REV. STAT. § 541.351(1) (2010). In Wash-
ington it means simply “reliance on scientific methods to test the results of ac-
tions taken so that the management and related policy can be changed promptly 
and appropriately.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 76.09.020(1) (West 2010). 
 34. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, jointly administered by the Army 
Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) and the EPA, establishes a program to regu-
late the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States, 
including wetlands. Activities in waters of the United States regulated under 
section 404 include fill for development, water resource projects (such as dams 
and levees), infrastructure development (such as highways and airports), and 
mining projects. Section 404 requires a permit before dredged or fill material 
may be discharged into waters of the United States, unless the activity is ex-
empt from section 404 regulation (e.g., certain farming and forestry activities). 
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the regulatory requirements for “planning and documentation” 
in mitigation plans, the rule requires compilation of an “adap-
tive management plan” to “guide decisions for revising compen-
satory mitigation plans and implementing measures to address 
both foreseeable and unforeseen circumstances that adversely 
affect compensatory mitigation success.”35 With the require-
ment of adaptive management plans in hand, however, the rule 
does not go much further in explaining how they are to be de-
signed and implemented, leaving it to the local Army Corps 
“district engineer, in consultation with the responsible party 
(and other federal, tribal, state, and local agencies, as appro-
priate), [to] determine the appropriate measures.”36 The upshot 
of the rule is that the adaptive management plan will be used 
when needed, at which time the district engineer and regulated 
party will figure out how to adapt.  
This wait-and-see approach hardly seems what Holling and 
his adaptive management theory progeny have in mind. Rather 
than require plans that build in the objectives, hypotheses, 
models, standards-information flows, and transparency of 
adaptive management, these rules leave the actual content of 
plans undetermined and the practice of adaptive management 
up to the opaque post-permit contacts between local Army 
Corps officials and permittees. This is indicative of how an 
elaborate theory has descended into a vague promise of future 
adjustments without clear standards. The litigation described 
in Part II provides many other examples of this devolution from 
theory to a/m-lite.37 
Some of the open-ended qualities of the Army Corps’ adap-
tive management policy could be explained as necessary given 
the nature of section 404 as regulating primarily private lands 
and actions38—meaning the Army Corps takes proposed actions 
as they come and cannot know ahead of time how adaptive 
management can be effectively designed. But the story is little 
better for federal public land management agencies. There is no 
shortage of stakeholders interested in how public lands are 
managed and plenty of opportunities exist for them to chal-
 
See Wetland Regulatory Authority, U.S. EPA OFF. WATER, http://water.epa.gov/ 
type/wetlands/outreach/upload/reg_authority.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
 35. 33 C.F.R. § 332.4(c)(12) (2009). 
 36. Id. § 332.7(c)(3). 
 37. See infra Part II. 
 38. Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political 
Economics of American Natural Resources Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 
487, 620 n.361 (2003). 
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lenge agency decisions. The U.S. Forest Service and the DOI 
have led the way toward adaptive management among federal 
land management agencies. The Forest Service positioned 
adaptive management as the driver in its 2008 “environmental 
management systems” (EMS) rules for national forest plan-
ning,39 and the DOI adopted a broad adaptive management pol-
icy for all its agencies in March 2007.40 Still, details are lack-
ing.  
The Forest Service’s 2008 rule, for example, touts adaptive 
management over twenty times in the preamble,41 but only 
twice in the rule text: once to define it,42 and once to proclaim it 
is the essence of land management planning,43 but never to ex-
plain how it is implemented. Instead, the agency adopted the 
concept of “environmental management systems” to, in theory 
(according to the preamble), capture all that is part of adaptive 
management and more.44 The agency said it “believes incorpo-
rating EMS in the planning rule better integrates adaptive 
management and EMS in Forest Service culture and land 
management planning practices.”45 
The DOI approach is in one sense more substantive but in 
others more indirect. The DOI has proposed, as part of its rules 
implementing NEPA, that all its agencies adopt adaptive man-
agement, but does not therein define adaptive management or 
prescribe the contents of adaptive management plans.46 Rather, 
the March 2007 DOI policy mandates use of a “technical guide” 
to define what adaptive management is and how an agency is 
 
 39. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg. 
21,468, 21,469 (Apr. 21, 2008) (emphasizing the need for a forest system man-
agement rule that “[p]romotes the use of adaptive management”).  
 40. See Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3270, § 2 (Mar. 9, 2007) (“Con-
sideration of [adaptive management] is warranted when: (a) there are conse-
quential decisions to be made; (b) there is an opportunity to apply learning; (c) 
the objectives of management are clear; (d) the value of reducing uncertainty 
is high; (e) uncertainty can be expressed as a set of competing, testable mod-
els; and (f ) an experimental design and monitoring system can be put in place 
with a reasonable expectation of reducing uncertainty.”). 
 41. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg. 
at 21,469–505. 
 42. 36 C.F.R. § 219.16 (2009). 
 43. Id. § 219.3(a) (“Land management planning is an adaptive manage-
ment process that includes social, economic, and ecological evaluation; plan 
development, plan amendment, and plan revision; and monitoring.”). 
 44. Id. § 219.5. 
 45. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg. 
at 21,475.  
 46. Using Adaptive Management, 43 C.F.R. § 46.145 (2009). 
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to implement it.47 The DOI adaptive management website 
presents a series of case studies to illustrate the technical guide 
in action, with contexts including multiple use lands, wildlife 
refuges, national forest restoration projects, and the Glen Can-
yon dam.48 The guidance and the case studies do provide useful 
practical suggestions for adaptive management, but they do not 
aggregate into a coherent policy. The DOI nonetheless believes 
this approach “has great promise as an effective means to ad-
dress significant resource management challenges under condi-
tions of uncertainty.”49 That, of course, will depend on how it is 
put into practice.  
C. PRACTICE 
Natural resource law is as much the management of con-
flict as it is the management of public lands, waters, or species. 
The first generation of litigation over adaptive management 
highlights two key disparities that are likely to exacerbate con-
flict and misunderstanding as agencies attempt to translate 
theory into action. One disparity arises from the different val-
ues evident in law and management. The other disparity sepa-
rates scholarly adaptive management theory50 from actual fed-
eral agency practice.  
1. Perspectives on Agency Decisionmaking: Law Versus 
Management 
Modern U.S. administrative law and many of the environ-
mental statutes enacted over the past forty years value the 
transparency and certainty of two-step decisionmaking. The 
first step is the pluralist debate during which groups comment 
on draft documents and debate various alternatives. The 
second step is the final agency action, when the government 
throws the switch and makes the decision it will implement 
and defend if challenged in court. The legal system regards the 
point of final agency action as a phase change when the fluid 
 
 47. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 29, at v.  
 48. See Adaptive Management In Use, U.S. DEPARTMENT INTERIOR, http:// 
www.doi.gov/initiatives/AdaptiveManagement/casestudies.html (last modified 
Sept. 14, 2010). 
 49. Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3270, supra note 40, § 2. 
 50. For a discussion of adaptive management theory, see supra text ac-
companying notes 12–17. 
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period of deliberation ends and implementation/defense of a 
fixed record and plan of action begins.51 
This decision method relies on two central attributes: (1) 
use of “front-end” analytical tools comprehensively conducted 
and concluded prior to making the decision final, and (2) the 
assumption of a robust capacity to predict and assess environ-
mental impacts and overall costs and benefits of a proposed ac-
tion.52 For example, regulations promulgated under the ESA 
provide for consultations between the FWS and other federal 
agencies about the impacts of actions on protected species. 
These regulations require the FWS to “[e]valuate the effects of 
the action and cumulative effects” and decide “whether the ac-
tion, taken together with cumulative effects, is likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of listed species.”53 In other 
words, the FWS must decide, once and for all, whether an ac-
tion taken today will jeopardize a species at some point in the 
future. The agency may revisit its decision only if the action 
remains subject to continuing federal control and either new in-
formation or modifications of the action present effects that 
were not previously considered.54 
 
 51. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 
(1971) (holding that a record contemporaneous with agency deliberation must 
document the consideration of relevant factors supporting the decision—
justifications offered after the final agency action cannot provide the legal 
support to uphold an agency action). 
 52. Professors Sidney Shapiro and Robert Glicksman have produced a rich 
body of scholarship exploring the “front-end” prediction approach to environ-
mental agency decisionmaking. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. 
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH, 
at x (2003) (suggesting that pragmatism, rather than utilitarianism, is the 
“appropriate baseline from which to design and implement risk regulation”); 
Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Improving Regulation Through In-
cremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2004) (advocating a 
shift in focus from “front-end” regulatory adjustment to “back-end” regulatory 
improvements, including use of adaptive management); Sidney A. Shapiro & 
Robert L. Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, ENVTL. F., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 
42, 42 (“Instead of the increased ‘front end’ examination of regulations, such as 
cost-benefits analysis, that is pushed by the critics—and is causing stagnation 
of rulemaking—a pragmatic approach would look at a regulation’s actual ‘back 
end’ effects after promulgation and make incremental adjustments as 
needed.”). 
 53. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3)–(4) (2009). The agency defines cumulative ef-
fects as “those effects of future State or private activities, not involving Feder-
al activities, that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area.” Id. 
§ 402.02. 
 54. See id. § 402.16. 
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As shown above, adaptive management in theory employs 
a much more complicated, multistep approach, which values 
the honing of predictive models and outcomes more than the 
fairness of the process.55 Adaptive management theory regards 
decisionmaking as more of a series of fine-tuning steps that are 
continually and perpetually reevaluated.56 The legal view of a 
resource management plan is that it comprehensively eval-
uates all rational considerations at once and then flips a toggle 
switch; the adaptive management approach twiddles the dial as 
information trickles in. 
Adaptive management squares up much better with the 
needs of many contemporary resource management problems.57 
The comprehensive, front-end assessment methods of conven-
tional resource management will likely face significant chal-
lenges in addressing problems such as climate change. The im-
pacts of climate change necessitating human and 
environmental adaptation are excruciatingly difficult to pre-
dict.58 Nonlinearities in change dynamics, environmental feed-
back properties, and the interactions of social and ecological 
responses will soon exceed the boundaries of knowledge and 
experience that have allowed environmental impact assessment 
and cost-benefit analysis to maintain what reliability and cred-
ibility they have.59 Indeed, even before climate change adapta-
 
 55. See supra text accompanying notes 12–17. 
 56. See supra text accompanying notes 12–17. 
 57. See supra Part I.A (discussing how ever-changing ecosystems require 
management policies that can adapt to new and uncertain climate conditions). 
 58. Many ecologists believe we face a “no-analog” future—one for which 
we have no experience on which to base projections of ecosystem change, and for 
which models designed to allow active management decisions as climate 
change takes effect are presently rudimentary and imprecise. See Peter Cox & 
David Stephenson, A Changing Climate for Prediction, 317 SCIENCE 207, 207 
(2007); Matthew C. Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Spe-
cies Distribution Models and the Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18 
BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 2255, 2255 (2009); Douglas Fox, Back to the 
No-Analog Future?, 316 SCIENCE 823, 823 (2007); Douglas Fox, When Worlds 
Collide, CONSERVATION, Jan.–Mar. 2007, at 28, 31. 
 59. The scientific literature exploring these complex dynamics and expos-
ing our lack of understanding about what lies ahead as temperature rises is 
legion. See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, THRESHOLDS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN ECOSYSTEMS 74–84 (2009), available at http://downloads 
.climatescience.gov/sap/sap4-2/sap4-2-final-report-all.pdf (examining numer-
ous positive feedback properties leading to nonlinear thresholds in climate 
change dynamics); Almut Arneth et al., Clean the Air, Heat the Planet?, 326 
SCIENCE 672, 672–73 (2009) (examining the feedback effects between conven-
tional air pollution control and climate change mitigation, and concluding that 
complex positive and negative feedback links exist and that, on balance, the 
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tion became a pressing need, the challenges of front-end envi-
ronmental impact assessment were evident in ecological con-
texts that were increasingly understood to be exceedingly com-
plex.60  
For example, a 1997 guide on considering cumulative ef-
fects under NEPA explains that “[d]etermining the cumulative 
environmental consequences of an action requires delineating 
the cause-and-effect relationships between the multiple actions 
and the resources, ecosystems, and human communities of con-
cern. Analysts must tease from the complex networks of possi-
ble interactions those that substantially affect the resources.”61 
The guide advises analysts to “gather information about the 
cause-and-effect relationships between stresses and resources” 
and to develop “a conceptual model of cause and effect 
. . . [with] [n]etwork[] and system diagrams [as] the preferred 
methods of conceptualizing cause-and-effect relationships.”62 
Adaptive management seems more in tune with this approach 
than does conventional front-end decisionmaking. 
The problem with adaptive management is that courts are 
better equipped to review toggle switching than dial twid-
 
evidence and models suggest that “air pollution control will accelerate warm-
ing in the coming decades”); Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate Change: 
Forcings, Feedbacks, and the Climate Benefits of Forests, 320 SCIENCE 1444, 
1444 (2008) (“[C]omplex and nonlinear forest-atmosphere interactions can 
dampen or amplify anthropogenic climate change.”); I. Eisenman & J.S. Wet-
tlaufer, Nonlinear Threshold Behavior During the Loss of Arctic Sea Ice, 106 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCE 28, 28 (2009) (describing the nonlinear “tipping 
points” in the ice-albedo feedback effect); Jerome Gaillardet & Albert Galy, 
Himalaya—Carbon Sink or Source?, 320 SCIENCE 1727, 1727–28 (2008) (ex-
plaining the uncertainties of the sinks and sources of the carbon geological 
cycle); Steven W. Running, Ecosystem Disturbance, Carbon, and Climate, 321 
SCIENCE 652, 652–53 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of ecological sinks 
and sources and how they might be impacted by episodic disturbances such as 
fires and insect epidemics).  
 60. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Com-
plexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 
(2003) (discussing environmental complexity theory, which suggests that envi-
ronmental events do not follow typical statistical distributions and are, thus, 
extremely difficult to plan for or predict); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmen-
tal Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean up the Environment by 
Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997) (explain-
ing how the subject matter of environmental law consists of “interlinked com-
plex adaptive systems,” the existence of which pose unique problems in terms 
of environmental management and regulation). 
 61. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS 
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, at vi (1997). 
 62. Id. at 38. 
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dling.63 As the previous section demonstrated, agency policies 
for implementing adaptive management arose in a statutory 
vacuum and are themselves largely devoid of legal details.64 
While judges might generally understand the rationale for 
adaptive management and worry about discouraging experi-
mentation that will lead to better conservation outcomes, the 
absence of clear statutory authority and well-defined regulatory 
standards will likely make evaluating agency adaptive man-
agement plans a struggle.65 There are no statutory standards 
for oversight, no concrete legal definitions for determining what 
qualifies as adaptive management, and few binding steps in 
adopting adaptive management.66 In rejecting “cookbooks” for 
adaptive management, agencies have failed to fill in the gaps 
left by statutes that either predate, ignore, or simply mention 
adaptive management in passing.67 Agency policies support 
adaptive management as “learning while doing,” but courts are 
bound to review agency behavior in accordance with laws prem-
ised on a different paradigm. Part II of this Article reviews the 
court decisions relating to this disparity between agency poli-
cies and traditional administrative law and describes how 
judges attempt to reconcile it. 
2. Adaptive Management: Theory Versus Practice 
If one disparity in judicial interpretation arises from the 
disconnect between adaptive management and conventional 
administrative law, the second key disparity arises from the 
gap between the theory of adaptive management as explored in 
the scholarly literature and the practice as manifest in the ac-
tual plans agencies label as “adaptive management.” The 
“learning while doing” policy approach to adaptive manage-
ment, although formless in substance, could have accommo-
dated agencies’ implementation of adaptive management by 
adopting plans that fulfill the theory of adaptive management. 
But the fiscal realities of natural resources management in the 
field demand bare-bones approaches to project planning and 
 
 63. See infra Part II (discussing how courts have analyzed the legality of 
adaptive management). 
 64. See supra Part I.B (describing how adaptive management lacks a con-
crete definition or framework of statutory guidance and, thus, is difficult to 
implement in practice). 
 65. See supra Part I.B. 
 66. See supra Part I.B. 
 67. See supra Part I.B. 
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conservation.68 In this lean environment, the incentives for 
field-level resource managers are to get the doing done through 
triage and to save the learning for better times.  
Indeed, as the agency policies discussed above and the cas-
es explored in Part II illustrate, agencies in practice have em-
ployed what we call “a/m-lite,” a stripped-down version of adap-
tive management that almost always neglects to develop 
testable hypotheses as the basis for management actions.69 Of-
ten a/m-lite fails even to structure a learning procedure, 
whether through experimentation, historical research, or mod-
eling.70 Furthermore, lack of follow-through plagues implemen-
tation. As the cases show, there are other dimensions to the 
agency plans that depart from adaptive management theory 
because of limited funding.71 This a/m-lite approach, in its most 
extreme form, is open-ended contingency planning or “on-the-
fly” management that promises some loosely described re-
sponse to whatever circumstances arise. Some a/m-lite imple-
mentation can fairly be considered a passive form of adaptive 
management, suitable to circumstances where the range of 
possible variations in actions and outcomes are small.72 But 
a/m-lite may also slip into “basic trial and error learning in 
which explicit hypotheses are absent or vague,” or there may be 
 
 68. See Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endan-
gered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 471–75 (2004) (explaining how many en-
vironmental laws do not allocate the funds necessary to operate at optimum 
levels); see also OUTDOOR RES. REVIEW GRP., GREAT OUTDOORS AMERICA 4 
(2009), available at http://www.orrgroup.org/documents/July2009_Great-Outdoors 
-America-report.pdf (finding appropriations to be “woefully inadequate to meet 
identified needs for land and water conservation and outdoor recreation”); 
Caitlin A. Burke et al., Policy News: Natural Resource Agency Funding, 32 
WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 260, 262 (2004) (“Working to achieve enhanced funding 
and sound policies for wildlife conservation has always been important for wild-
life professionals, but now—in this time of budget shortfalls—it is essential.”). 
 69. See Doremus, supra note 1, at 562 (“The potential for learning has too 
often been ignored in environmental regulation and natural resource man-
agement.”). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See, e.g., S. Fork Band Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d 
718, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (describing a hastily prepared EIS 
that the court held inadequate due to its lack of detail).  
 72. See R. Gregory et al., Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria 
for Applications to Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 2411, 2412 (2006) (distinguishing active adaptive management, 
which hews closely to the theoretical model, from passive adaptive manage-
ment, which retains some of the benefits of the theoretical approach while sac-
rificing some scientific rigor). 
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a complete lack of monitoring and meaningful adjustments.73 
At its worst, a/m-lite may be a pretext for postponing difficult, 
but important, decisions in order to dodge the constraints of 
budgets, politics, or scientific uncertainty.74 
The difference between adaptive management, as prac-
ticed, and the adaptive management concept universally 
praised as essential for dealing with the complexities of natural 
systems does not illustrate a disagreement about how adaptive 
management should work as much as it reveals the budgetary 
and political limitations of agencies responsible for implemen-
tation.75 After all, we cannot expect agencies to carry out 
projects for which they have no funding. Moreover, adaptive 
management cannot dissolve the political conflicts that sur-
round competition for scarce resources.76  
Nonetheless, the gap between theory and practice raises an 
important concern about bait and switch. Agencies base their 
departure from the conventional, comprehensive rationality 
model on the literature arguing that adaptive management is a 
superior approach.77 But as the examples in Part II show, the 
policies and rules agencies have adopted leave them plenty of 
room to implement something different from the adaptive man-
agement approach supported by the management literature. 
Our concern is whether the agency-implemented a/m-lite is 
enough of an improvement over the comprehensive rationality 
assumption of front-end decisionmaking to justify the loss of 
certainty and transparency. This concern is particularly impor-
tant because adaptive management is most often invoked as a 
tool to handle decisionmaking in the face of uncertainty.78 
Theoretical adaptive management reduces uncertainty over 
time, as experiments yield insights about how ecosystems re-
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 2411. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Carol Hirschon Weiss, The Experimenting Society in a Political 
World, in VALIDITY & SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 283, 284 (Leonard Bickman 
ed., 2000) (discussing the view that politics play an important role “in influen-
cing how feasible . . . advocacy of experimental reform [can] be”). 
 77. See supra Part I.A (discussing the theories that have caused adaptive 
management to become a popular modern approach to environmental regula-
tion). 
 78. See supra Part I.A (describing how ever-changing ecosystems demand 
management policies that can keep pace with changing conditions). 
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spond to various interventions.79 But a/m-lite, which typically 
neglects hypothesis testing, does not help in this manner.80 
Even when it does specify a hypothesis to test, management 
practice often shortchanges evaluation. Part II of this Article 
examines this disparity by analyzing cases that have engaged 
the courts in disagreements about what constitutes legal adap-
tive management. 
II.  LITIGATION OVER ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT   
In a relatively short time, the adaptive management label 
for agency resource management plans has become ubiquitous. 
Since 1993, each of the major federal resource management 
agencies has made a policy commitment to employ adaptive 
management.81 At one time, a casual reader of a draft Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS) could predict which alterna-
tive an agency would likely prefer by identifying the one that 
included “balanced approach” in its title.82 Over the past decade 
the tip-off has become “adaptive.”83  
 
 79. See Doremus, supra note 1, at 549 (“[I]t is possible to reduce uncer-
tainty over time in ways that are relevant to subsequent iterations or related 
decisions.”).  
 80. See id. at 569 (discussing how adaptive management is often used as a 
means to “muddle through” and act in the face of uncertainty “without any en-
forceable requirements for learning or incorporating new knowledge”). 
 81. Many of these are discussed infra in Part II.B. The Northwest Power 
Planning Council was the most important early adopter when it employed 
“adaptive management” in its 1982 Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Pro-
gram to address pervasive scientific uncertainty regarding salmon recovery. 
See Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1380 
(9th Cir. 1994). Adaptive management continues to be the organizing principle 
for fish conservation in the Columbia Basin today. See NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. ET AL., FCRPS ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: 2008–2018 FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER 
SYSTEM BIOLOGICAL OPINION (2009), available at http://www.salmonrecovery 
.gov/Files/BiologicalOpinions/AMIP_09 10 09.pdf (purporting to strengthen the 
agencies’ 2008 biological opinion—which the U.S. District Court in National 
Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 524 F.3d 917 (9th 
Cir. 2008), remanded for being structurally flawed under the ESA—by, inter 
alia, establishing new biological triggers to activate short- and long-term re-
sponses, and providing a rapid response to any detected significant decline in 
fish populations).  
 82. See, e.g., Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Singleton, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 
1195 (D. Or. 1998) (stating that the preferred alternative is one which articu-
lates an intention to provide a “balanced approach” to protecting Oregon’s riv-
ers); Am. Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 534 F. Supp. 923, 928 (C.D. Cal. 1981) 
(demonstrating that the Bureau of Land Management takes a balanced ap-
proach to conservation planning). 
 83. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION: FINAL 
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Therefore, it was inevitable that courts would be called 
upon to evaluate how well the “adaptive” alternatives selected 
by agencies meet legal requirements. Every year, more and 
more published federal court decisions employ the term “adap-
tive management.” However, most cases using or even discuss-
ing the term “adaptive management” focus on issues peripheral 
to the key disparities at the heart of this analysis. Because an 
increasing majority of new federal resource management deci-
sions use an adaptive management framework, a steady stream 
of challenges to federal resource management decisions need to 
discuss the framework to set the stage for evaluating the unre-
lated legal challenges.  
A May 13, 2010, search of Westlaw and LexisNexis re-
ported 120 federal court decisions containing the phrase “adap-
tive management.”84 That group can be distilled to sixty-nine 
cases involving a challenge to adaptive management of the en-
vironment or natural resources.85 In most of those cases, courts 
 
BISON AND ELK MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
4 (2007), available at http://www.fws.gov/bisonandelkplan/ROD.pdf [hereinafter 
BISON AND ELK PLAN] (choosing the “Adaptively Manage Habitat and Popula-
tions” alternative). Increasingly, however, it can be difficult to find an alterna-
tive in a resource management EIS that does not purport to be adaptive. See, 
e.g., Cal. Res. Agency v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. C 08-1185 MHP, 2009 WL 
6006102, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009) (rejecting a challenge to a forest- 
plan EIS in which all alternatives employed adaptive management because 
the Forest Service is not compelled to evaluate alternatives incompatible with 
its “basic policy objectives” or its “fundamental policy choice”). 
 84. Our focus is on identifying and analyzing judicial decisions in which 
the court directly evaluates the legality of an agency’s use of adaptive man-
agement to implement a regulatory program. We recognize that there are like-
ly many pieces of litigation involving disputes over, among other things, an 
agency’s use of adaptive management that does not produce a judicial opinion 
directly assessing its legality. Some judicial opinions might also evaluate the 
legality of a specific agency action designed to implement adaptive manage-
ment without ever mentioning adaptive management as the agency’s funda-
mental guiding motivation; though our impression is that as much as agencies 
advertise their purported use and implementation of adaptive management in 
policy documents, they would be no less eager to do so in court filings. Identi-
fying and analyzing cases in both of these categories of cases would be impor-
tant to gain a complete understanding of how adaptive management has fared 
in the judicial forum. The most important cases for our purposes, however, are 
those in which a court speaks directly to the use and legality of adaptive man-
agement. The language of these judicial opinions most substantively forms the 
jurisprudence of adaptive management.  
 85. The disparity between “decisions” and “cases” represents the fact that 
thirteen disputes (i.e., cases) produced more than one court decision. E.g., Pac. 
Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008). No single case produced more than one decision applying the law 
directly to adaptive management.  
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did not directly apply law to the adaptive aspect of the agency 
action. Instead, the courts employed the term to describe the 
action before getting to the legal issues dispositive to the case.86  
Nonetheless, thirty-one federal court decisions do grapple 
with the legality of adaptive management. The United States 
lost more than half of these cases,87 a poor record given the def-
erence accorded to agencies under administrative law.88 It is 
these cases that reveal the most about the two key disparities 
highlighted previously: (1) between the principles underlying 
law and adaptive management, and (2) between adaptive man-
agement in theory and a/m-lite in practice. This study of the 
first round of litigation emerging from the federal consensus 
that natural resources agencies should practice adaptive man-
agement yields three key lessons about how those disparities 
have worked out in the courts: (1) larger-scale plans are more 
likely to incorporate successful adaptive management plans 
than smaller ones;89 (2) the practice of tiering site-specific envi-
ronmental impact analyses to an earlier, overarching, cumula-
tive study is well suited to adaptive management, and adaptive 
management can reduce the need for a supplemental EIS;90 
and (3) adaptive management procedures, no matter how finely 
crafted, cannot substitute for showing that a plan will meet the 
substantive management criteria required by law.91  
To set the stage for the analysis of these three themes, 
three sweeping observations are in order. First, it is worth not-
 
 86. See, e.g., Se. Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 139 (D.D.C. 
2010) (mentioning that the plan in question employs adaptive management, 
but recognizing that the disposition of the case actually turns on the definition 
of “withdrawal” under 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a), rather than the legality of adaptive 
management).  
 87. Not all of the government losses were due to problems with adaptive 
management. For instance, the Ninth Circuit overturned the 2004 Sierra For-
est Framework for NEPA violations while upholding its adaptive management 
component. See infra notes 130–41 and accompanying text (discussing the 
analysis of the 2004 Sierra Forest Framework and the legitimacy of adaptive 
management techniques). 
 88. While the loss record for the United States is poor in these cases com-
pared to administrative litigation overall, natural resource challenges general-
ly fair better for plaintiffs in court than one would expect given the deferential 
standard of review. See Denise M. Keele et al., Forest Service Land Manage-
ment Litigation 1989–2002, 104 J. FORESTRY 196, 198 (2006) (discussing how, 
of the 729 cases challenging Forest Service resource management decisions, 
the agency won only 57.6 percent).  
 89. See infra Part II.A. 
 90. See infra Part II.B. 
 91. See infra Part II.C. 
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ing that a court upholding an a/m-lite approach does not neces-
sarily endorse the practice as advancing the goals of either law 
or conservation policy. It simply means that the use of a/m-lite 
did not run afoul of any specific legal requirement or substitute 
for a required finding or procedure.92 While courts may approve 
agency actions that involve terrible applications of adaptive 
management, it is fair to say that the most vague and incom-
plete plans have a greater likelihood of remand.93 
Second, many decisions applying the administrative law 
standards of deference to agency expertise do not involve adap-
tive management, but are relevant to understanding how 
courts regard it. For instance, the rigor with which an agency 
should explore the effects of similarly situated actions before 
committing to a new one is central to many natural resource 
cases.94 The active learning component of adaptive manage-
ment makes these cases relevant even if they did not review 
plans that purported to apply adaptive management. There-
fore, we bring to bear on the question of how courts apply law 
to adaptive management cases beyond the relatively small 
sample of decisions that have already evaluated specific chal-
lenges to adaptive management.95 
Third, regardless of the particular outcome of judicial re-
view, courts generally wish to support the trend toward adap-
tive management.96 They seem to understand that arguments 
 
 92. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. C 04-
04647 CRB, 2005 WL 3021939, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (demonstrating 
that the court did not pass judgment on the wisdom of an adaptive manage-
ment approach, but still found that the approach satisfied NEPA planning re-
quirements).  
 93. See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 
387 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a general discussion of an envi-
ronmental problem across a large area did not satisfy NEPA).  
 94. See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(refusing to analyze whether the agency incorporated adaptive learning from 
prior logging projects before beginning another, similar project); see also infra 
note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the Lands 
Council v. McNair case in greater depth). 
 95. E.g., S. Fork Band Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718 
(9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (providing an example of how courts deal with re-
source management plans that are relatively vague and general in scope); see 
also infra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of open-
ended contingency planning). 
 96. See, e.g., Cal. Res. Agency v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. C 08-1185 MHP, 
2009 WL 6006102, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009) (accepting a limitation on 
the range of alternatives considered in a national forest plan’s EIS to exclude 
strategies other than adaptive management). 
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in the conservation management literature all regard adaptive 
management as the best-suited decisionmaking technique for 
ecosystems.97 Indeed, at least one court has come close to re-
quiring adaptive management in holding that ESA HCPs must 
contain some provision to respond to unforeseen circum-
stances.98 Courts sometimes explicitly state that they do not 
wish to create disincentives for using adaptive management.99 
Even where adaptive management plans have run afoul of judi-
cial review, courts are careful to state that only the particular 
application in the case at hand is illegal, not adaptive man-
agement itself.100 It is fair to conclude from this litigation that 
courts, despite their roots in the conventional administrative 
law model of a phase change at the time of final agency action, 
generally give agencies wide berth within statutory constraints 
to alter traditional planning approaches to accommodate adap-
tive management. 
A. BIGGER IS BETTER 
Spatial and temporal scale is a critical component of adap-
tive management.101 Applying adaptive management through 
larger area, longer time frame plans has tended to produce bet-
ter outcomes for agencies in the courts.102 Though this may be 
due to the larger budgets associated with developing (and to a 
lesser extent, implementing) the plans, the primary advantage 
 
 97. See id. 
 98. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1144 
(S.D. Cal. 2006); see also discussion infra note 215. 
 99. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. C 04-
04647 CRB, 2005 WL 3021939, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (holding that 
the agency’s implementation of an adaptive management plan does not consti-
tute a “major federal action” under NEPA, therefore sparing it from the re-
quirement of preparing a supplemental EIS and making the plan easier to put 
into place). 
 100. For example, see Northwest Resources Information Center, Inc. v. 
Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1380 n.18 (9th Cir. 1994), 
where the court described adaptive management as “scientifically sound,” but 
rejected particular aspects of the government’s implementation of the plan. 
 101. See Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conserva-
tion from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under 
the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 146–48 (2002) (sum-
marizing the benefits of large-area plans). 
 102. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1311 
(W.D. Wash. 1994) (suggesting that compliance with environmental protection 
statutes requires planning on a scale that considers the entire ecosystem), 
aff’d sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1404–06 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 
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enjoyed by large-scale plans is slack.103 The larger the plan, the 
more room there is for trade-offs between competing interests, 
zones with different dominant uses (including control areas for 
experiments), and flexibility for revising management guide-
lines to reflect lessons learned.104 Larger plans tend to employ a 
version of adaptive management that comes closer to the model 
in the scholarly literature than do smaller-scale plans.105 The 
literature addressing how conservation can adapt to climate 
change also highlights the greater utility of larger spatial and 
temporal scale planning.106 
The litigation over adaptive management discussed in the 
remainder of Part II.B also reflects the advantages of the larg-
er-scale plans. Four major adaptive management efforts consti-
tute about half of the federal litigation grappling with the con-
cept. With a few notable exceptions, discussed below, federal 
agencies in these four areas have experienced success in per-
suading courts to defer to their management choices and adap-
tive plans. Two of the efforts deal with forest management: the 
Northwest Forest Plan, covering 24.4 million acres in Washing-
ton and Oregon, and the Sierra Forest Framework, covering 
11.5 million acres in California. The other two deal with water 
infrastructure: management of the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
River Delta (and its related infrastructure supplying water to 
the Central Valley) and operation of the Missouri River works 
controlled by the Army Corps. 
 
 103. See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 101, at 147 (noting that larger-
scale plans are “more flexible because [they disperse] the burden of preservation 
or restriction of development over a broad area to allow for more trade-offs”). 
 104. This mirrors the experience of habitat conservation planning under 
the ESA. See id. at 147–48 (“Just as flexibility to trade off between habitat 
conservation and degradation shrinks with the geographic size of the plan, it 
also diminishes over time as a species becomes more imperiled.”). But see 
Gregory et al., supra note 72, at 2423 (highlighting the problems of large-scale, 
long-term experimental design, and noting the failures in applying adaptive 
management to the Columbia River Basin and the Everglades). 
 105. See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 101, at 147 (suggesting that 
larger plans more closely follow adaptive management techniques because 
they are more comprehensive, and less piecemeal, than smaller plans). 
 106. See, e.g., Brad Griffith et al., Climate Change Adaptation for the US 
National Wildlife Refuge System, 44 ENVTL. MGMT. 1043, 1043 (2009) (noting 
that “[g]eographic isolation and small unit size compound the challenges of 
climate change,” which means that “strategic response requires system-wide 
planning”). 
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The Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) is one of the earliest 
large-scale adaptive management efforts,107 and one of the most 
successful in attracting support from the courts for the adap-
tive management concept. Its age and scope make it the cham-
pion survivor of dozens of rounds of litigation. The NWFP re-
sulted from a compromise brokered by President Clinton, who 
played an unprecedented (and, to date, unemulated) personal 
role in shaping the contours of the compromise it represented 
between timber and environmental interests.108 The immense 
plan is strikingly complex, but in general outline it consisted of 
four elements: land allocation, aquatic conservation strategy, 
survey and monitoring requirements, and adaptive manage-
ment.109 
The goal of the NWFP, originally completed in 1994, is to 
allow for substantial timber harvesting while maintaining the 
forest characteristics that support viable populations of north-
ern spotted owls, salmon runs that breed in forest streams, and 
hundreds of other species sensitive to logging operations.110 
Adaptive management plays a leading role in two aspects of the 
plan: administration of lands specially designated for adaptive 
management experimentation, and as a general principle for 
implementation and revision of the overall set of management 
 
 107. The Northwest Power Planning Council was an agency that sought to 
use adaptive management in a large-scale plan early on with the 1982 Colum-
bia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. See Nw. Res. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Nw. Pow-
er Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1380–83 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the im-
plementation of the 1982 plan and subsequent adaptations). 
 108. See U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. ET AL., RECORD OF DECISION FOR 
AMENDMENTS TO FOREST SERVICE AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 
PLANNING DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL 
1 (1994) [hereinafter ROD NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL], available at http://www 
.reo.gov/library/reports/newroda.pdf (identifying the conference held by Presi-
dent Clinton as a catalyst for the NWFP); STEVEN L. YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF 
THE SPOTTED OWL 141–43 (1994) (describing the conference and its surround-
ing circumstances). 
 109. Both a Record of Decision and an EIS were based on FOREST 
ECOSYSTEM MGMT. ASSESSMENT TEAM, FOREST ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: 
AN ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ASSESSMENT, at II-3 to II-4 (1983) 
[hereinafter FEMAT REPORT] (discussing the general approach of the plan). 
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT OF HABITAT FOR 
LATE-SUCCESSIONAL AND OLD-GROWTH FOREST RELATED SPECIES WITHIN 
THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (1994) (demonstrating that two 
documents based on the FEMAT report were similarly complex and focused).  
 110. See FEMAT REPORT, supra note 109, at II-1 to II-2 (outlining numer-
ous goals of the FEMAT Report). 
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prescriptions for the NWFP.111 As we later discuss, it is this 
second aspect of adaptive management in the NWFP that has 
generated litigation. 
The land-allocation zones fall into three categories.112 Some 
seventy-eight percent of the lands covered by the NWFP are 
designated late-successional reserves, where maintaining and 
encouraging the development of old-growth forests is the pri-
mary aim.113 Some logging consistent with this aim, such as 
thinning to promote or enhance old-growth attributes, occurs in 
this category.114 Most of the timber output, however, comes 
from the second category, the matrix lands between the re-
serves. The third category designates ten zones ranging from 
84,000 to 400,000 acres to serve as “adaptive management 
areas,” where experiments with adaptive management would 
be the primary purpose.115 Though the track record of the adap-
tive management areas does offer some general lessons for im-
proving adaptive management generally, the unique mandate 
limits their application.116 The true test of NWFP adaptive 
management is its success in guiding the vast majority of lands 
designated matrix or reserve, where balancing timber produc-
tion against environmental values generated—and continues to 
generate—enormous controversy.117 It is the lands not specifi-
 
 111. See id. at II-4 (discussing the development of long-term management 
alternatives); id. at II-11 to II-12 (identifying adaptive management areas as 
places used to test and develop management approaches). 
 112. The Record of Decision actually identifies seven different types of land 
allocations, but those allocations fit into categories of reserves, land allowing 
for timber output, and land for adaptive management. See ROD NORTHERN 
SPOTTED OWL, supra note 108, at 6–7. 
 113. See id. at 29. 
 114. See id. at 62–63 (discussing the importance of thinning). 
 115. FEMAT REPORT, supra note 109, at III-24, III-30 to III-33 (identifying 
the regions to be used as adaptive management areas). 
 116. For discussions on the track record of adaptive management areas, see 
generally, GEORGE H. STANKEY & BRUCE SHINDLER, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
AREAS: ACHIEVING THE PROMISE, AVOIDING THE PERIL (1997), available at 
ftp://ftp.blm.gov/pub/blmlibrary/BLMpublications/AdaptiveManagement/Adaptive
MgmtTechGuide/CDReferences/Stankey_1997_Adaptive%20Management%20 
Areas%20-%20Achieving%20the%20Promi.pdf; Andrew N. Gray, Adaptive Eco-
system Management in the Pacific Northwest: A Case Study from Coastal Ore-
gon, CONSERVATION ECOLOGY (Nov. 23, 2000), http://www.ecologyandsociety 
.org/vol4/iss2/art6/; Forest Fleischman, Bureaucracy, Collaboration and Co-
production: A Case Study of the Implementation of Adaptive Management in 
the U.S.D.A. Forest Service (Apr. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/publications/materials/conference_ 
papers/fleischman.pdf . 
 117. The leading analysis of how well the NWFP modeled actual adaptive 
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cally set aside for adaptive management experiments where the 
NWFP experience most closely resembles routine federal con-
servation policy challenges. 
The overarching NWFP mandate for adaptive management 
through monitoring and evaluation involved multiple levels of 
planning to restrict disturbance to riparian areas in an “aquatic 
conservation strategy” (ACS) and “survey and manage” (S&M) 
requirements for over 400 species, with some triggering popula-
tion surveys before ground-disturbing activity, such as logging. 
Courts rejected challenges to the original NWFP, including its 
adaptive elements.118 Subsequently, the ACS and S&M provi-
sions of the NWFP were common bases for judicial remands 
overturning timber sales.119 Appropriations and political will 
never fully supported implementation of these components of 
adaptive management, but the framework for forest manage-
ment remains a workable process for some projects.120 Still, the 
adaptive management requirements and the degraded condi-
tions of the forests in the NWFP resulted in far less logging 
than promised.121 
 
management is B.T. Bormann et al., Adaptive Management of Forest Ecosys-
tems: Did Some Rubber Hit the Road?, 57 BIOSCIENCE 186, 186 (2007), who 
explore “the concepts of adaptive management as they were developed [through 
FEMAT] and applied on federal lands through the Northwest Forest Plan.” 
 118. E.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1310–17 
(W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 
1401, 1404–06 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 
 119. See, e.g., Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fish-
eries Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing the ACS’s 
short-term protections that work to ensure the habitat will support the migra-
tion cycles of salmon, while also finding that the long-term recovery of the 
aquatic habitat may not be sufficient to comply with the NWFP); Or. Natural 
Res. Council Action v. U.S. Forest Serv., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1093–94 (W.D. 
Wash. 1999) (emphasizing the importance of S&M to the NWFP process be-
cause finding new populations of sensitive species before logging allows for the 
placement of protections). 
 120. See K. Norman Johnson et al., Forest Ecosystem Management Assess-
ment Team Assessments, in BIOREGIONAL ASSESSMENT: SCIENCE AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 85, 107–11 (K. Norman Johnson et 
al. eds., 1999) (discussing measurements for success and support of adaptive 
management in the NWFP). Nonetheless, new circumstances, including the 
incursion of aggressive barred owls and climate change, have prompted the 
Obama Administration to begin a revision of the recovery plan for the North-
ern Spotted Owl in the NWFP. See April Reese, New Threats Could Under-
mine Obama Administration’s Plan for Northern Spotted Owl, LAND LETTER 
(Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/Landletter/print/2009/04/09/2. 
 121. See Johnson et al., supra note 120, at 107–09 (discussing the failure to 
meet goals for forest outputs). 
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In response to the underperformance of the NWFP in pro-
ducing cut timber, the George W. Bush Administration adopted 
amendments in 2004 that unsuccessfully attempted to relax 
two key elements of adaptive management: the ACS and the 
S&M rules.122 The issues with both actions are similar, but the 
court more thoroughly explored the issues in the context of 
S&M. A district court overturned the 2004 amendments to the 
NWFP that removed the S&M requirement for insufficient en-
vironmental analysis in the EIS.123 The original 1994 EIS for 
the NWFP justified the S&M standard as needed to gain in-
formation to ensure viability for a host of species, a core adap-
tive function.124 The court agreed with the government that it 
could change its opinion about the best way to balance goals in 
the NWFP, but it found that a change eliminating a fundamen-
tal standard of adaptive management requires thorough analy-
sis and disclosure of the environmental consequences.125 In 
other words, the adaptive framework of the NWFP depends on 
certain fundamental monitoring tools, such as S&M, that can-
not be reversed without revisiting the original charter and 
analysis (in this case, the NWFP and its EIS). A similar effort 
by the Bureau of Land Management to eliminate pre-logging 
surveys for the red tree vole (prey for spotted owls) met the 
same fate for failure to revise the underlying, large-scale adap-
tive management plans.126 
The Sierra Forest Framework is smaller, younger, and sub-
ject to fewer lawsuits. Still, it offers a useful contrast with the 
NWFP in the use of adaptive management to modify a multi-
forest management charter. In 2004 the Bush Administration 
significantly amended California’s Sierra Forest Framework, 
which governs administration of eleven national forests in the 
Sierra Nevada Range.127 The changes shifted the “management 
emphasis from biodiversity conservation and prescribed fire to 
 
 122. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries 
Serv., 482 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1251–53 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (overturning the 
Bush administration’s ACS amendments); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, 380 
F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1197–98 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (overturning the Bush Adminis-
tration’s S&M amendments).  
 123. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1192–93. 
 124. Id. at 1192. 
 125. Id. at 1193. 
 126. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 560–61 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
 127. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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aggressive mechanical thinning” and timber production.128 One 
particularly contentious aspect of the 2004 framework ex-
panded the number of trees that could be logged from those 
twelve to twenty inches in diameter to those up to thirty inches 
in diameter.129 Although the Ninth Circuit found the 2004 
framework flawed because its environmental impact analysis 
failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives,130 a dis-
trict court evaluating a challenge to the adaptive management 
provisions endorsed the approach.131 The adaptive management 
amendments were able to take advantage of the large scale of 
the Framework to employ different “modules” in different areas 
to comprise an “integrated research project.”132 This, along with 
the use of modeling projections, is a principal reason why the 
2004 Framework survived the allegation that the Forest Ser-
vice deferred taking the required “hard look” at wildlife impacts 
of more logging.133 Along with the NWFP, the 2004 Framework 
is one of the only adaptive management plans considered by 
courts that explicitly employed different management regimes 
in different areas to create experiments testing hypotheses 
about effects on forest fires and old-growth dependent species. 
In upholding the adaptive management approach, the district 
court fairly characterized the 2004 Framework as providing 
“more flexibility to strategically locate treatments across the 
landscape.”134 The large area covered by the Framework made 
these elements of the plan easier to employ. 
On the other hand, monitoring and mitigation modules do 
not necessarily lead to learning that can or will be applied to 
reshape projects. Indeed, the State of California complained 
that the Forest Service had increased the logging intensity in 
2004 without having applied data from the earlier, more con-
servative adaptive management approach in the 2001 frame-
work.135 A federal district court recently upheld individual for-
 
 128. Robert B. Keiter, Breaking Faith with Nature: The Bush Administration 
and Public Land Policy, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 195, 231 (2007). 
 129. Sierra Forest Legacy, 577 F.3d at 1018, 1020. 
 130. Id. at 1021–22. 
 131. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:05-cv-0211-
MCE-GGH, 2008 WL 3863479, at *16–17 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008). 
 132. Id. at *19. 
 133. Id. at *4, *17–21. 
 134. Id. at *8. 
 135. State of California’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Sup-
port of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, California ex rel. Lockyer, 2008 
WL 3863479 (No. 2:05-cv-0211-MCE-GGH). 
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est plan amendments in the Sierra region against a challenge 
that reduced monitoring of sensitive species created a foresee-
able risk of degradation through the activities, such as logging, 
authorized by the plans.136 The court wrote that “it presumes 
too much to argue that [the previous, more detailed monitoring] 
obligations would have turned up information that would have 
inclined the Forest Service to significantly alter or modify a 
particular project.”137 Though one can view the court’s decision 
as skepticism about the value of the additional monitoring, it 
also speaks to the absence of enforceable commitments in most 
a/m-lite to revise projects in light of monitoring.138 
It is also worth noting that big plans often enjoy special 
appropriations associated with congressional support of adap-
tive experiments.139 In the case of the Sierra forests, the Her-
ger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act au-
thorized specific funding for pilot projects.140 Combined with 
the national priority to address fire risk and forest health, the 
high-profile Framework was able to secure funds for monitor-
ing and response of management experiments.141 This funding 
is a rare, but reassuring, element of adaptive management 
practice that ameliorated the loss of certainty in management 
criteria occasioned by the 2004 amendments. 
The most cited litigation endorsing the notion that adap-
tive management is compatible with NEPA and administrative 
 
 136. Sierra Forest Legacy v. U.S. Forest Serv., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1088–
91 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 137. Id. at 1090. 
 138. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate 
Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY 
L.J. 1, 47–48 (2009) (describing the problems with adaptive management im-
plementation for portions of the Colorado River that flows downstream of the 
Glen Canyon Dam). 
 139. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 12, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-211, ch. 3, 108 Stat. 3, 
16 (1994) (earmarking funding for the NWFP). The Northwest Forest Plan 
program reported that it spent $50 million for monitoring. VALERIE RAPP, 
NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN—THE FIRST 10 YEARS (1994–2003), at 11 (2008). 
 140. Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, § 401, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-307 to -308 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. § 2104 (1998)). Funding for the pilot projects totaled $25.3 million in 
2008, more than three times the amount appropriated in 1999. U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC. ET AL., STATUS REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2008: HERGER-
FEINSTEIN QUINCY LIBRARY GROUP FOREST RECOVERY ACT PILOT PROJECT 4 
(2009), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/hfqlg/monitoring/report_to_congress/ 
2008/fy08_report_to_congress_letter.pdf. 
 141. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:05-cv-0211-
MCE-GGH, 2008 WL 3863479, at *19 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008). 
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law concerns the Army Corps’ management of the Missouri 
River, which it controls through dams. After the D.C. District 
Court enjoined a river-operating plan for failing to comply with 
the ESA,142 a series of cases beginning in 2004 have upheld the 
Army Corps’ approach of employing adaptive management to 
balance the needs of wildlife dependent on the natural seasonal 
variation in flows (especially for the imperiled pallid sturgeon, 
least tern, and piping plover) with the interests of flood control 
and navigation.143 Though the courts did not grapple with the 
adaptive management approach as deeply in this litigation as 
in the other examples we discuss, its use on this scale by the 
Army Corps is a significant step in the spread of comprehensive 
adaptive management plans beyond the traditional public land 
and wildlife agencies. 
Probably the most complex of all the large-scale plans ad-
dresses the vast infrastructure diverting huge volumes of water 
coming down the Sacramento River, around the delta it shares 
with the San Joaquin River, and directing it to users further 
south.144 The dams and diversions are operated jointly by state 
and federal agencies, and the environmental issues include 
wildlife, irrigation, flood risk, and potability of municipal water 
supplies for tens of millions of people.145 The litigation chal-
lenging the adaptive management regimes pertaining to differ-
ent species in the water system composes a mixed record.146 As 
with the other examples discussed in this section, the large 
area covered by the watersheds and the large volumes of water 
certainly permit a wider array of trade-offs than can occur with 
 
 142. Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 253–58 
(D.D.C. 2003) (finding mere mitigation measures inadequate to meet the ESA, 
but launching a new biological opinion that triggered subsequent litigation in 
the Eighth Circuit). 
 143. In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 516 F.3d 688, 690–94 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (finding that an EIS was not necessary because adaptive manage-
ment flexibility was provided for in an earlier Record of Decision); In re Opera-
tion of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 635–36 (8th Cir. 2005) (allowing 
for flow adjustment based on subsequent information and providing for a focus 
on adaptive management). 
 144. See Cent. Delta Water Agency v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 653 F. 
Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 145. See id. at 1073–74.  
 146. Compare Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. 
Supp. 2d 1122, 1193–94 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (upholding adaptive management 
plan), with Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 
387–88 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that the adaptive management plan failed to 
take into account sufficient information).  
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smaller projects.147 But, in these Delta cases, the enormous 
complexity of the statutes, contracts, and governing bodies 
(both state and federal) likely undermined what would other-
wise be a strong candidate for successful adaptive manage-
ment. We will discuss how a single court approved one Delta 
adaptive management plan but remanded another in Part II.C, 
below, when we discuss the relationship between substantive 
legal standards and the adaptive process. 
B. NEPA: EFFECTIVE USE OF TIERING AND REDUCED NEED FOR 
SUPPLEMENTS 
The environmental impact analysis required by NEPA is 
perhaps the grandest expression of the comprehensive rational-
ity worldview rejected by adaptive management.148 So, it is 
somewhat surprising to find in NEPA practice a tool well suited 
to adaptive management: a/m-lite roots well in the soil of 
NEPA tiering. Tiering, a practice dating to the 1970s, permits 
agencies to proceed with broad programs without examining 
site-specific effects.149 In situations such as the adoption of a 
forest plan, or a regional methane leasing program, the agency 
may defer the details of impact analysis until such time as it 
proposes a timber sale150 or receives applications for permits to 
drill.151 The first NEPA tier concentrates on cumulative im-
pacts of anticipated successive activities without evaluating the 
peculiar situations that may arise from any particular activi-
ty.152 Tiering relieves an agency from evaluating uncertain con-
tingencies with tenuous connections to the overall impacts.153 
 
 147. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 327–47 (discussing 
the trade-offs that occur when assessing an adaptive management plan for the 
Central Valley Project).  
 148. See generally Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 297, 299 (1999) (describing comprehensive rationality). 
 149. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20, 1508.28 (2009); Forty Most Asked Questions 
Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 18,026, 18,033 (Mar. 23, 1981) (describing in question 24(c) the function 
of tiering). 
 150. See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 
387 F.3d 989, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 151. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. Salazar, 603 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63–66 
(D.D.C. 2009). 
 152. See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. at 18,033. 
 153. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (“Tiering . . . helps the lead agency to focus on 
the issues which are ripe for decision and exclude from consideration issues 
already decided or not yet ripe.”). 
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The subsequent levels of NEPA compliance occur as particular, 
site-specific projects requiring approval.154 At that point, the 
general discussions of the first tier may be incorporated by ref-
erence, and the EIS or EA will focus on just those issues specif-
ic to the particular activity.155 In fact, a subsequent EIS will of-
ten be unnecessary if a particular project creates only effects 
already anticipated in the first tier EIS.156 For site-specific 
projects, agencies commonly prepare environmental assess-
ments concluding in findings of no significant impacts (FON-
SIs) that go beyond those adumbrated by the original program’s 
EIS.157 
Large-scale adaptive management generally involves a 
massive EIS intended to serve as an overarching analysis to 
which subsequent projects and adjustments may be tiered.158 
This is how the adaptive charter works to guide subsequent 
projects for the NWFP,159 and the national forests in the Sierra 
Nevada Range.160 Indeed, the adaptive elements of the EISs 
may even reduce the need for a subsequent supplemental EIS. 
In Oregon Natural Resources Council Action v. United States 
Forest Service,161 a court remanded a timber sale because it did 
not include the S&M required by the NWFP.162 The NWFP 
created binding law that the court ordered the agency to follow 
or amend.163 However, the court rejected a NEPA claim that 
the United States needed to prepare a supplemental EIS to 
consider a variety of new information about forests, wildlife 
and, water quality that had emerged since the adoption of the 
NWFP.164 The court rebuffed the claim by relying, in part, on 
 
 154. See id. § 1502.20. 
 155. See id. § 1508.28. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and 
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 
909–10 (2002) (explaining that a vast majority of environmental assessments 
result in a FONSI).  
 158. See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,033 (Mar. 23, 1981). 
 159. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1403–04 
(9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (noting the overarching EIS process). 
 160. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:05-cv-
0211-MCE-GGH, 2008 WL 3863479, at *1–3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008). 
 161. 59 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 162. See id. at 1091–94.  
 163. Id. at 1093.  
 164. Id. at 1096. 
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the adaptive management strategy in the NWFP.165 The court 
determined that adaptive management anticipated that new 
information would emerge and provided mechanisms for ad-
justment.166 This is an example of how the flexibility of adap-
tive management can ease the burden for an agency needing to 
comply with NEPA over the course of a very long-term project, 
such as restoring late-successional forests. A different judge in 
the same court later reached the same result in a challenge to a 
different timber sale after subsequent developments raised 
doubts about the NWFP’s assumptions concerning logging on 
private land.167 Again, the court relied on the adaptive man-
agement component of the NWFP to establish an assumption 
that no supplemental study would be needed absent a showing 
that the information could not be addressed by the adaptive 
process.168  
On the other hand, a subsequent decision justified as adap-
tive modification may go too far in changing the terms of the 
original framework in the first tier. In that case, courts require 
a supplemental EIS. In Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. 
Boody,169 the Ninth Circuit enjoined timber sales in part be-
cause a change in the survey requirements for the red tree vole 
went too far beyond what the tier one NWFP EIS anticipated, 
even with adaptive management.170 The federal government 
had argued that the decision to change the vole’s S&M designa-
tion was within the adaptive latitude created by the NWFP.171 
The court examined the NWFP EIS and disagreed.172 The les-
son from Klamath Siskiyou is that an agency cannot tier when 
revising a fundamental standard of an overarching adaptive 
management plan.173 
Another risk posed by the attraction of tiering is that an 
agency will defer making controversial decisions on the basis 
that it can work out the details of a fairly vague commitment to 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Hanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301–04 (W.D. 
Wash. 2001). 
 168. Id. at 1304. 
 169. 468 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 170. Id. at 561.  
 171. Id. at 560. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. 
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goals in subsequent tiers.174 Unfortunately, the agency may be 
setting itself up for failure if it is unable to secure the resources 
to adequately tackle the difficult analysis in subsequent tiers. 
Also, vague commitments that do not include site-specific crite-
ria may simply allow political momentum to overwhelm the 
plan’s objective. In the EIS supporting the elk and bison man-
agement plan for the National Elk Refuge and nearby lands, 
the agency defined the (ultimately selected) “adaptive man-
agement” alternative as a plan implemented through a “struc-
tured framework . . . of adaptive management criteria and ac-
tions for transitioning from intensive supplemental winter 
feeding.”175 However, the plan neither describes the “structured 
framework” nor defines the “criteria.” Given the strong local po-
litical support for maintaining supplemental winter feeding, 
opponents are understandably skeptical that such a vague 
commitment will result in a transition to more natural winter 
ranging behavior and lower elk populations.176 The goal of the 
“adaptive management” alternative is to reduce the winter elk 
population of the region by nearly twenty percent,177 but the 
path to achieve it is not evident in the plan. Deferring a firm 
decision to take a critical action, such as terminating winter 
feeding until a subsequent incremental adaptive process, may 
be a recipe for failure.178 Yet adaptive management and tiering 
can make it easier for agencies to yield to the temptation to 
 
 174. Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2009) (discussing the “broader statement” 
created in the first tier). 
 175. BISON AND ELK PLAN, supra note 83, at 65.  
 176. See Robert L. Fischman & Angela M. King, Savings Clauses and 
Trends in Natural Resources Federalism, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 129, 137–41 (2007). Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental 
groups have challenged the plan for these and other reasons. Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 37–43, Defenders of Wildlife v. Kemp-
thorne, 698 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 08-CV-00945).  
 177. See BISON AND ELK PLAN, supra note 83, at 3, 19 (proposing a reduc-
tion in elk numbers from 13,000 to 11,000). 
 178. See Mary O’Brien, Uneasy Riders: A Citizen, a Cow, and NEPA, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,632, at 10,633 (2009) (describing environmental impact 
analysis for Forest Service allotment management plans that respond to de-
graded conditions with “vague commitments to future adaptive management” 
without “clear triggers for applying the unspecified adaptive management 
measures”). Another example of deferring difficult decisions through adaptive 
management is the decision to adopt grazing allotments in the Sawtooth Na-
tional Forest. See W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV 05 189 E 
BLW, 2006 WL 292010, at *2 (D. Idaho Feb. 7, 2006) (stating that the adap-
tive management strategy “did not define the protocols it would use or de-
scribe the monitoring that is the heart of the strategy”).  
  
460 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:424 
 
dodge difficult, controversial decisions.179 It is not surprising, 
then, that courts frequently reject adaptive management plans 
as too amorphous.180 Professor Glicksman has characterized 
some of this litigation as standing for the principle that agen-
cies may not rely “on adaptive management as an excuse for de-
ferring real planning in favor of” an approach that promises to 
deal with expected future problems as they arise.181 
Even if not amorphous, a promise to adaptively manage 
problems may not fulfill the NEPA requirement that agencies 
take a “hard look” at the impacts of their action. For instance, 
High Sierra Hikers Association v. Weingardt182 overturned a 
Forest Service decision to liberalize the rules limiting campfires 
in high country parts of a wilderness area.183 Despite a record 
raising a number of problems with the decision, including dis-
parate treatment of commercial-pack trips compared to private 
backpacking, physical impacts from fires and their residues, 
and potential introduction of exotic seeds and pathogens 
through packed wood, the Forest Service went forward with the 
looser rules on the basis that it could monitor and adjust in re-
sponse to problems.184 The court ruled that the agency could 
not rely on adaptive management to overcome an inadequate 
response to the problems raised in the record.185  
On the other hand, Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Part-
nership v. Salazar (TRCP)186 rebuffed a claim that an adaptive 
management approach to handling site-specific and uncertain 
impacts violated the NEPA’s requirement to evaluate environ-
 
 179. See Beth C. Bryant, NEPA Compliance in Fisheries Management: The 
Programmatic Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement on Alaskan 
Groundfish Fisheries and Implication for NEPA Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 441, 450 (2006). 
 180. See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 
183, 209–10 (D.D.C. 2008); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. 
Supp. 2d 322, 387 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Mountaineers v. U.S. Forest Serv., 445 F. 
Supp. 2d 1235, 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2006); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Ar-
my Corps of Eng’rs, 457 F. Supp. 2d 198, 234–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). But see De-
fenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 698 F. Supp. 2d 141, 149–50 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(upholding the National Elk Refuge’s elk management plan despite its 
amorphous adaptive management approach to reducing winter elk popula-
tions), appeal docketed, No. 08-cv-00945 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2010). 
 181. Glicksman, supra note 4, at 871. 
 182. 521 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 183. Id. at 1090–91. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1091. 
 186. No. 09-5162, 2010 WL 2869778 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010). 
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mental effects before an agency undertakes an action.187 In con-
trast to High Sierra Hikers Association, which involved site-
specific environmental analyses for each special use permittee 
and lifted an outright ban on campfires above specified eleva-
tions,188 TRCP reviewed a broad plan (covering more than 
270,000 acres in the Atlantic Rim of Wyoming) for natural gas 
development that did not yet authorize a specific ground-
disturbing activity.189 The TRCP court refused to read the 
NEPA regulations to require detailed commitments to mitiga-
tion for “long-term” plans.190 Specific activities are subject to 
subsequent evaluations, tiered to the plan, and “exact applica-
tion of mitigation measures will be determined on a site-specific 
basis.”191 Once again, tiering helped rescue a/m-lite. 
Though adaptive management, in and of itself, does not 
trigger an EIS,192 adaptive management is not an alternative to 
NEPA.193 A district court relied (in part) on NEPA itself to re-
ject a 2005 rule substituting adaptive management for prepar-
ing EISs in developing national forest plans.194 The court found 
that the administrative record failed to support a judgment 
that substituting adaptive management would result in no sig-
nificant environmental outcomes.195 
C. PROCEDURES FOR ADAPTATION CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR 
SHOWING COMPLIANCE WITH SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS 
Another temptation of adaptive management is to lavish 
attention on the iterative process at the expense of addressing 
the substantive management criteria required by law.196 Courts 
are particularly attentive to substantive management criteria 
 
 187. Id. at *14 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (b)). 
 188. High Sierra Hikers Ass’n, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1072, 1090. 
 189. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship, 2010 WL 2869778, at *3–4. 
 190. Id. at *16. 
 191. Id. at *15. 
 192. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. C 04-
04647 CRB, 2005 WL 3021939, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005). 
 193. See Julie Thrower, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequi-
librium View of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
871, 894 (2006). 
 194. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 
1059, 1086–87 (N.D. Cal. 2007).  
 195. Id. at 1089–90. 
 196. See Wiersema, supra note 4, at 1256 (arguing that adaptive manage-
ment by agencies pays insufficient attention to substantive goals). 
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in statutes, such as the “no jeopardy” standard in the ESA,197 
and regulations, such as the “viability” standard for animal 
populations in national forests.198 Since the 1970s, courts have 
required agencies to develop records showing how they will 
meet substantive standards.199 The first round of litigation over 
adaptive management reveals that courts are holding firm to 
this principle. Promises to plan, collaborate, or manage toward 
compliance should environmental conditions degrade below the 
substantive management criterion are insufficient to survive 
judicial review.200 
 
 197. The “no jeopardy” standard explains that each federal agency must 
ensure that its actions “are not likely to jeopardize” any endangered species or 
habitats. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). Courts are often attentive to the “no 
jeopardy” standard. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
551 U.S. 644, 669 (2007) (“[N]o-jeopardy duty covers only discretionary agency 
actions and does not attach to actions (like the NPDES permitting transfer 
authorization) that an agency is required by statute to undertake once certain 
specified triggering events have occurred.”); Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Because the ESA 
does not prescribe how the jeopardy prong is to be determined, nor how species 
populations are to be estimated, we hold that it is a permissible interpretation 
of the statute to rest the jeopardy analysis on a habitat proxy.”); Pac. Coast 
Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1167 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008) (“[A] jeopardy regulation . . . requires . . . agencies to consider both 
recovery and survival impacts on listed species.” (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. 
Nat’l Marines Fisheries Serv., 481 F.3d 1224, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007))).  
 198. The “viability standard” is embodied in 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000) (“In 
order to insure that viable populations [of fish and wildlife] will be main-
tained, habitat must be provided to support, at least, a minimum number of 
reproductive individuals and that habitat must be well distributed so that 
those individuals can interact with others in the planning area.”). Although 
formally revoked by National Forest System Land and Resource Management 
Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514 (Nov. 9, 2000), that replaced it with a less spe-
cific “sustainability” standard, the “viability” standard remained in place for 
forest planning through most of the Bush Administration. See, e.g., Native 
Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1237 n.5 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“[A]pplication of these [new] regulations was delayed . . . . As a result, 
the regulations relevant [in the case at bar] are found in the July 1, 2000 Code 
of Federal Regulations.”).  
 199. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
419 (1971) (affirming the Administrative Procedure Act’s, 5 U.S.C. § 706 
(2006), requirement that courts review agency decisions based on the agency’s 
“whole record”).  
 200. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 
322, 387 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (“Adaptive management is within the agency’s dis-
cretion to choose and employ, however, the absence of any definite, certain, or 
enforceable criteria or standards make its use arbitrary and capricious under 
the totality of the circumstances.”); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1078, (D. Or. 2001) (explaining that the Army 
Corps’ adaptive management approach provided the court with insufficient 
information to rule on summary judgment); Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 
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The ESA is a prevalent vehicle for placing substantive 
management criteria on otherwise discretionary management 
of public lands and waters. The listing of a species often trig-
gers new restrictions on longstanding management regimes, 
such as water allocations (for example in California’s Sacra-
mento Delta)201 or timber harvests (for example in the Pacific 
Northwest).202 The ESA, therefore, often drives adaptive man-
agement plans to substitute for older ways of using public re-
sources. Once a management issue triggers ESA compliance, 
the biological opinion of the Fish & Wildlife or Fisheries Service 
will essentially establish the boundaries for permissible man-
agement options.203 The biological opinions determine which 
actions will cross the line into jeopardizing the continued exis-
tence of a species, and what measures will be required to pro-
tect an agency from liability under the ESA. The litigation re-
veals that it is these biological opinions that often prompt 
agency adaptive management.204  
 
F. Supp. 2d 96, 113 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that a FWS management plan for 
grizzly bears, which included adaptive management among other schemes, did 
not meet ESA requirements because “[d]efendants have not met their burden to 
develop objective, measurable criteria by which to assess present or threatened 
destruction, modification or curtailment of the grizzly bear’s habitat or 
range”). But cf. Or. Natural Res. Council Action v. U.S. Forest Serv., 59 F. Supp. 
2d 1085, 1096 (W.D. Wash 1999) (“The plan’s adaptive management approach 
is adequate to deal with any new information plaintiffs have identified.”).  
 201. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 653 F. Supp. 
2d 1066, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (describing the effects of the decision to list 
smelt on the water management plan). 
 202. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(per curiam) (noting the effect of listing the spotted owl on the existing forest 
management plan). See generally YAFFEE, supra note 108 (describing the his-
tory of the listing decision for the spotted owl and its ramifications with re-
spect to politics and environmental regulations).  
 203. This is particularly true after the action agency has adopted the condi-
tions of the biological opinion. See Delta Smelt Consol. Cases, 686 F. Supp. 2d 
1026, 1043–44 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“The adaptive management protocol pre-
scribed . . . leaves FWS with the final word on exactly what flow requirements 
will be imposed.”).  
 204. See, e.g., In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 
626 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The 2000 BiOp RPA also mandated habitat restoration, a 
comprehensive species and habitat monitoring program, and an adaptive 
management framework.”); Consol. Salmonid Cases, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 
1025 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“[In the] 2008 Smelt BiOp . . . the adaptive manage-
ment protocol [was] prescribed in the RPA.”); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s 
Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (E.D. Cal 2008) (“The BiOp 
was intended to address the potential adverse impacts of ongoing (for the next 
twenty-five years) CVP and SWP operations on the salmonid species.”); id. at 
1184–85 (discussing the biological opinion’s impact on adaptive management).  
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A pair of decisions by U.S. District Court Judge Oliver 
Wanger in the Eastern District of California provides a particu-
larly illuminating contrast in the relationship between adap-
tive management and substantive legal standards.205 Both cas-
es concerned challenges to adaptive management plans for op-
operating the vast water infrastructure that moves water 
through and around the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta 
in California. The listing of the Delta smelt by the FWS and 
salmonid species by the Fisheries Service triggered two differ-
ent biological opinions in order to fulfill the legal duty not to 
jeopardize the continued existence of the fishes under the ESA. 
The water project consulted separately with the two services. 
This gave rise to two sets of adaptive management plans (one 
for the smelt and one for the salmonids) that generated two dif-
ferent lawsuits.  
Both plans employed adaptive management, but Judge 
Wanger upheld one and remanded the other under the usual 
judicial standard that an agency must provide “reasonable cer-
tainty” that it will meet a statutory requirement.206 The expla-
nation for these disparate results hinges on whether the adap-
tive management framework offered more than mere process. 
The salmonid adaptive management protocol, approved by 
Judge Wanger, contained definite, substantive criteria that 
served as triggers for reinitiating ESA consultation to revise 
management.207 Also, the Fisheries Service’s biological opinion 
imposed “enforceable definite and certain requirements” on the 
operation of the water works.208 In contrast, the smelt adaptive 
management protocol failed to provide enforceable, precise cri-
teria to bind operators of the system.209 The adaptive manage-
 
 205. Compare Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 
1194 (remanding the case, but upholding the adaptive management plan), 
with Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (remanding the adap-
tive management plan). 
 206. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1184; 
Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 353.  
 207. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1186 (estab-
lishing a temperature trigger of fifty-six degrees to reinitiate consultation). 
Judge Wanger subsequently remanded a later salmonid biological opinion for 
an arbitrary and capricious formulation of water flow restrictions. See Consol. 
Salmonid Cases, No. 1:09-cv-01053-OWW-DLB, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2010) 
(Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Plaintiffs’ Request for Prelimi-
nary Injunction), available at http://www.endangeredspecieslawandpolicy.com/ 
uploads/file/Salmon%20PI.pdf. 
 208. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (impos-
ing mandatory terms and conditions as part of an incidental take statement). 
 209. Id. (comparing cases). 
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ment protocol for the smelt did not bind the operators, but it 
was procedurally elaborate. It involved a complex “risk assess-
ment matrix” containing criteria that, if met, would trigger a 
working group to meet.210 The group would then “consider” a 
range of management changes.211 While the process itself was 
mandatory, the court faulted the protocol for failing to assure 
that the result of the process would be some kind of action tak-
en to secure the continued existence of the smelt.212 Judge 
Wanger did not assert that the agency meant to disregard its 
statutory responsibilities, just that the record of decision failed 
to ensure that they would be met.213  
In overturning the smelt adaptive management protocol, 
the court contrasted another ESA case addressing a large-scale 
HCP that would allow land development in the Natomas Basin 
of the Sacramento area to proceed notwithstanding harms to 
listed species.214 The Natomas Basin HCP employed adaptive 
management to deal with the uncertainty of where and when 
development would occur (as well as how effective mitigation 
measures would conserve the effected species).215 Judge Wang-
er distinguished the adaptive adjustment in the Natomas Basin 
plan as “employ[ing] well-defined mitigation measures” such as 
conservation land purchases, adjustment of conservation re-
 
 210. Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 341. 
 211. Id.  
 212. See id. at 352. 
 213. See id. at 354. 
 214. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2000) 
(endorsing the adaptive management elements of the HCP/incidental take 
permit while overturning it on a variety of other grounds related to the misfit 
between the scale of the plan and the governance/commitment of the program). 
 215. A subsequent case overturning a HCP found that long-term take per-
mits under the ESA require some procedure to deal with unforeseen circum-
stances. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 
1145 (S.D. Cal. 2006). The court relied, in part, on National Wildlife Federa-
tion to show that adaptive management may fulfill that necessary role. See id. 
at 1144. The origin of the requirement to address unforeseen circumstances is 
in the original HCP dealing with development of San Bruno Mountain, which 
the House Conference Report endorsed with legislation that ultimately author-
ized incidental take permits. See ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AMENDMENTS OF 
1982, H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 31–32 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2860, 2872–73. Courts now routinely approve HCPs that rely on adaptive 
management. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 594, 598 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (upholding a conservation 
plan, which included adaptive management, because it was “negotiated and 
regulated vigorously” by the FWS).  
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serve size, and modification of agricultural practices.216 He also 
distinguished the Natomas Basin plan for its quantified objec-
tives and required mitigation measures, even though those 
elements could be adjusted.217 These substantive distinctions 
allowed Judge Wanger to distinguish the Natomas Basin plan, 
which was actually more vaguely drawn than the smelt adap-
tive matrix. 
The pair of Wanger opinions are important for two reasons. 
First, they likely contain the most thorough judicial discussion 
to date of adaptive management’s strengths and weaknesses. 
They recognize a role for adaptive management within admin-
istrative law, allowing a “balance” between “flexibility” (adap-
tive management) and “certainty” (final agency action).218 This 
is the fundamental trade-off that courts will continue to me-
diate in future adaptive management cases. Second, the opin-
ions are important because they draw a line illustrated by two 
concrete examples, one on the legal side (salmonids) and one on 
the illegal side (smelt). This comparison is particularly signifi-
cant because the smelt adaptive management protocol was not 
at all vague. It was far more detailed than most a/m-lite plans. 
Yet, when held against a substantive legal standard, the court 
could not find the “reasonable certainty” of compliance.219 
It is not surprising that the ESA, with its famously uncom-
promising mandate,220 would establish a boundary limiting 
 
 216. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 355–56 (emphasis 
added). 
 217. Id. at 356. In contrast, Animal Welfare Institute. v. Beech Ridge Ener-
gy, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540 (D. Md. 2009), enjoined construction of a ridge-top, 
wind turbine project because of the likely harm to endangered Indiana bats. In 
language reminiscent of the smelt biological opinion, the state permit required 
the energy company to “consult” with a technical advisory committee regard-
ing the “potential for adaptive management” and agree to “test adaptive man-
agement strategies.” Id. at 556. The court found the adaptive management 
scheme too discretionary to overcome the need for an incidental take permit 
for the bats likely to be harmed. Id. at 579. 
 218. Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 
2d 1122, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 2008).  
 219. Id.; see also Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Servheen, 672 F. Supp. 2d 
1105, 1116 (D. Mont. 2009) (holding that a commitment to future monitoring 
of the agency designation for grizzly bear populations could not substitute for 
substantive findings required in the statute). 
 220. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, 194–95 (1978) (noting 
that the ESA intends to “halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, 
whatever the cost,” and thereby strikes a balance “in favor of affording endan-
gered species the highest of priorities”). 
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weak forms of a/m-lite.221 However, several other types of cases 
find that adaptive management fails to meet substantive crite-
ria of agency law and policy. Agencies employing adaptive 
management to sustain FONSIs justifying a decision not to 
prepare an EIS have seen their efforts overturned by courts un-
convinced that vague, a/m-lite will assure that the impacts of a 
project will not be significant.222 In this respect, a/m-lite may be 
better suited to an EIS where mitigation need only be dis-
cussed, not assured, than to mitigated FONSIs, which must 
create a record of decision demonstrating (generally through 
the mitigation measures) the absence of significant impacts.223 
The mitigation in the record of decision subsequently binds 
agency action, unlike a mitigation discussion in an EIS, which 
an agency need not implement. 
However, it is possible for an agency to fail to provide 
enough detail about mitigation under the more flexible stand-
ards of an EIS. Mitigation as open-ended contingency planning 
is not unique to adaptive management. The Ninth Circuit re-
cently found the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) Final 
EIS for expansion of a gold mine in Nevada to be inadequate 
because it failed to assess the effectiveness of mitigation pro-
posed to address possible hydrologic impacts from mine dewa-
 
 221. An early case grappling with adaptive management’s role in meeting 
substantive legal standards is Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6 F. 
Supp. 2d 1139, 1158 (D. Or. 1998), which rejected Oregon’s habitat restoration 
program that included watershed councils, monitoring, and adaptive man-
agement, as the basis for not listing coho salmon runs. The court found the 
program to consist of insufficiently certain “future, voluntary and untested 
habitat measures.” Id. at 1159. 
 222. E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 457 F. 
Supp. 2d 198, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (acknowledging that adaptive management 
practices “provide no assurance as to the efficacy of mitigation”); Mountaineers 
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2006) 
(“[A]daptive management strategies . . . amount . . . to a build-first, study later 
approach . . . [which is a] violation of NEPA.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 223. Two recent, very deferential decisions from Judge Leon illustrate how 
nebulously described adaptive management may support EIS mitigation. See, 
e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 698 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147–48 (D.D.C. 
2010) (upholding an elk management plan with little detail on mitigation 
measures to reduce harms of winter elk concentrations); Theodore Roosevelt 
Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 605 F. Supp. 2d 263, 279 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52 (1989)) 
(noting that adaptive management fulfills the EIS mitigation requirement, 
which only requires discussion of possible measures, not assurance that they 
will occur), aff’d, No. 09-5162, 2010 WL 2869778 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010). 
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tering.224 Without an assessment of effectiveness, the court de-
termined that mitigation cannot fulfill its purpose as described 
by the Supreme Court; specifically, to evaluate whether antic-
ipated environmental impacts can be avoided.225 In this case, 
the EIS described a monitoring regime and indicated that, if 
the monitoring showed mitigation measures were necessary, 
then the mining company would prepare a “detailed, site-
specific plan to enhance or replace the impacted perennial wa-
ter resources.”226 The absence of detail about the tools em-
ployed in such a plan, or on when exactly the plan would be 
triggered, is common in EISs employing adaptive management 
to defer some decisions to a later date. Recent draft guidance 
from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) aims to im-
prove NEPA mitigation by urging agencies to include more spe-
cific descriptions of mitigation measures (especially measurable 
performance standards) and to ensure that mitigation is car-
ried out.227 Both of these suggestions would significantly im-
prove federal adaptive management, which the CEQ recom-
mends, “in order to minimize the possibility of mitigation 
failure.”228 
Outside of NEPA, environmental laws frequently impose 
substantive standards on agencies that cannot be eluded 
through adaptive management. For instance, a federal district 
court found that an adaptive management approach to improv-
ing storm water phosphorus abatement did not fulfill the legal 
requirements of the Clean Water Act, which demand that spe-
cific effluent limitations be met.229 Even the public land organic 
acts, which grant broad discretion to agencies, including the 
latitude to manage adaptively, sometimes provide standards 
 
 224. S. Fork Band Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 727 
(9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 225. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 226. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., CORTEZ HILLS 
EXPANSION PROJECT: FINAL EIS § 3.2, at 111 (2008), available at http://blm 
.gov/nv/st/en/fo/battle_mountain_field/blm_information/national_environmental/ 
cortez_hills_expansion.html. 
 227. See Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, Council on Envtl. 
Quality on Draft Guidance for NEPA Mitigation & Monitoring, 3 (Feb. 18, 
2010), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/Mitigation_and_Monitoring_ 
Draft_NEPA_Guidance_Final_02182010.pdf. 
 228. Id. at 4. 
 229. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, No. 04-21448, 2010 
WL 1506267, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2010). 
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that a/m-lite fails to meet.230 Agencies run the risk of relying on 
adaptive management as an alternative to the harder work of 
showing how their plans will meet the substantive legal criteria 
for their land systems.  
Moreover, the focus on adaptive management in public 
land planning may distract agencies from the hard work of es-
tablishing substantive objectives that translate statutory and 
regulatory goals into place-based standards.231 Richard L. 
Schroeder’s recent study of the comprehensive conservation 
plans that each unit of the National Wildlife Refuge System 
must prepare under its organic legislation, revealed that the 
biological objectives, a key element of the plans required under 
implementing policy, seldom meet even two of the five criteria 
in the FWS handbook.232 The handbook requires each biological 
objective to be: “(1) Specific, (2) Measurable, (3) Achievable, (4) 
Results-oriented, and (5) Time-fixed.”233 Schroeder describes 
the problem with the plans’ neglect of substantive benchmarks: 
  If [the FWS] is to be able to manage in a manner consistent with 
the plans, and to practice adaptive management by monitoring 
progress, then the biological objectives in the plan must be specific 
 
 230. E.g., Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 558–59 
(9th Cir. 2006) (arguing that adaptive management modifications contem-
plated in a resource management plan do not shield subsequent management 
changes from complying with regulations setting out criteria for amending 
plans); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 195 
(D.D.C. 2008) (stating that an adaptive management plan for snowmobiles 
“provides no quantitative standard or qualitative analysis to support” a con-
clusion of no impairment under the park system Organic Act); High Sierra 
Hikers Ass’n v. Weingardt, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (illu-
strating that an agency may not rely on adaptive management to avoid a 
showing in the administrative record that it will meet the standards of the 
Wilderness Act). 
 231. See Refuge Planning Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge 
System Administration Act as Amended by the National Wildlife Refuge Sys-
tem Improvement Act of 1997, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,892, 33,906 (May 25, 2000) 
(stating that one of the eight goals of unit-level planning is “[to] provide a ba-
sis for adaptive management by monitoring progress, evaluating plan imple-
mentation, and updating refuge plans accordingly”). Substantive statutory 
goals for refuges include ensuring “that the biological integrity, diversity, and 
environmental health of the System are maintained,” 16 U.S.C. 
§ 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2006), and sustaining “healthy populations of fish, wildlife, 
and plants,” 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd(a)(4)(D)–668ee. 
 232. See Richard L. Schroeder, Evaluating the Quality of Biological Objec-
tives for Conservation Planning in the National Wildlife Refuge System, 26 
GEO. WRIGHT F. 22, 25 (2009).  
 233. Id. at 23 (quoting ROBERT S. ADAMCIK ET AL., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERV., WRITING REFUGE MANAGEMENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: A HANDBOOK 
8 (2004)). 
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and measurable, as recognized by [the FWS’s] own policy. If the objec-
tives lack specificity and detail, as the majority do, then [the FWS] 
will be unable to measure progress toward their achievement, and 
thus, will be unable to know if they are indeed managing refuge lands 
in a manner consistent with the plans.234 
In their haste to complete plans and to describe adaptive 
management procedures, agencies too often neglect the estab-
lishment of site-specific standards for measuring compliance 
with statutory or regulatory criteria. 
III.  LESSONS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT   
The picture that emerges from the first round of litigation 
over adaptive management should not surprise observers of 
conservation conflicts. One reason the ambitions expressed in 
law and policy exceed the abilities of agencies to implement is 
inadequate funding.235 Agencies attempt to maximize their dis-
cretion and minimize their exposure to political controversy 
from unpopular decisions.236 Interest groups, including envi-
ronmentalists, seek to lock in promises through binding com-
mitments early in the management process.237 Courts are at-
tentive to substantive management standards in reviewing 
agency records for compliance with the law. Most environmen-
tal managers and stakeholders approve of adaptive manage-
ment in theory; disagreements focus on application in prac-
tice.238 Courts cannot directly distinguish legitimate adaptive 
management from imposters.239 But in policing compliance 
with administrative and environmental law, courts can unmask 
some of the most egregious failures to incorporate the key ele-
ments necessary for structured learning during the course of a 
project, which often get sidelined in the rough and tumble of 
implementation.240 Given the limitations of the judicial role, we 
now offer some lessons for agencies and Congress for further 
improvement of adaptive management in practice. 
 
 234. Id. at 27. 
 235. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
 236. See Doremus, supra note 4, at 56. 
 237. Id. at 85. 
 238. See Fred Johnson, Protocol and Practice in the Adaptive Management 
of Waterfowl Harvests, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 8 (June 30, 1999), http://www 
.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss1/art8/. 
 239. See Gregory et al., supra note 72, at 2424. 
 240. See id.; Doremus, supra note 1, at 569–70. 
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A. LESSONS FOR AGENCIES 
Our research confirms the intuition that adaptive man-
agement is one of the most difficult tasks for agencies attempt-
ing comprehensive ecosystem stewardship.241 However, the im-
pression in agencies that lawsuits and appeals present a 
barrier to implementing adaptive management242 is unfounded. 
When agencies lose challenges to their adaptive management 
plans, it is often because their preference for management lati-
tude runs afoul of the need to show they can meet substantive 
and procedural standards in statutes, regulations, or even their 
own earlier plans. Several strategies can help agencies avoid 
that pitfall. 
1. Shoring Up a/m-lite in Substance 
In order to wring the most benefits from a/m-lite, agencies 
should strive to do their best to create plans that include as 
many of the elements of adaptive management theory as possi-
ble, especially designing management actions as experiments 
so that they promote learning to reduce uncertainty. However, 
this crucial element of adaptive management is not generally 
required by law and courts will not impose it.243 More struc-
tured learning would improve a/m-lite by capturing more bene-
fits of adaptive management theory. This reform will need 
strong prompting from Congress, agency leadership, and ad-
ministrative guidance. The courts will, however, impose some 
discipline on the use of a/m-lite.  
The lessons for an agency embarking on a/m-lite require it 
to restrain its enthusiasm for discretion: the plan must be as 
detailed as practical. The more vague the a/m-lite, the more 
likely that a court will find it inadequate.244 Criteria for meas-
uring success and triggering contingency actions must be clear-
ly articulated in the record of decision.245 Agencies should 
commit to monitoring the key criteria and should employ their 
 
 241. Tomas M. Koontz & Jennifer Bodine, Implementing Ecosystem Man-
agement in Public Agencies: Lessons from the U.S. Bureau of Land Manage-
ment and the Forest Service, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 60, 60 (2008). 
 242. Id. at 65–66. 
 243. See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (refus-
ing to take a close look at whether the agency adaptively learned from pre-
vious logging before undertaking another, similar logging project). 
 244. See supra text accompanying note 180. 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 176–80. 
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data when revising or expanding projects.246 Most important, 
adaptive management must have direction—it needs to deploy 
its procedural tools to home in on specific goals. 
Related to this lesson is that adaptive management cannot 
substitute for a showing of reasonable certainty that substan-
tive criteria will be met. The pageantry of procedures and flow 
charts may distract agencies from their mandates to achieve 
specific environmental objectives. Agencies should resist look-
ing at adaptive management as a short cut around the difficult 
task of compiling a record that substantiates claims about such 
key tests as viability, nonimpairment, or no jeopardy. Adaptive 
plans, to be effective, must translate the substantive standards 
of statutes, rules, and manuals into place-based objectives.  
2. Improving a/m-lite as Procedure 
While substantive standards, where they exist, helpfully 
constrain and focus adaptive management, there is also a set of 
lessons for agencies involving the procedural charter estab-
lished by NEPA, which requires all federal agencies to prepare 
an EIS for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.”247 Indeed, as the origins of 
adaptive management are found in Holling’s critique of conven-
tional environmental impact analysis, it is fitting that NEPA 
recently has been the subject of much thinking about how to 
promote adaptive management. In 1997, for example, the CEQ 
echoed Holling’s assessment that under the traditional NEPA 
model “adequate environmental protection depends solely on 
the accuracy of the predicted impacts and expected mitigation 
results” and that NEPA should be reoriented around 
“[a]daptive environmental management.”248 Building on that 
theme, the 2003 NEPA Task Force Report, Modernizing NEPA 
Implementation, contained a full chapter devoted to “[a]daptive 
[m]anagement and [m]onitoring,”249 the gist of which was to 
use NEPA to help move federal agencies from the “predict-
 
 246. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
 247. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).  
 248. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS 
AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 32 (1997). 
 249. NEPA TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 44 (2003). 
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mitigate-implement” model to the “predict-mitigate-implement-
monitor-adapt” model.250  
NEPA, of course, imposes no enforceable substantive du-
ties on federal agencies and thus cannot mandate adaptive 
management.251 Moreover, environmental impact analysis per-
formed under NEPA assumes the conventional front-end com-
prehensive predecisional form, so it cannot incorporate adap-
tive management as an assessment tool per se.252 But, the 
NEPA Task Force identified two avenues in which adaptive 
management and NEPA can usefully intersect in ways consis-
tent with our evaluation of the adaptive management case law 
presented in Part II.  
First, federal agency actions that employ adaptive man-
agement may be in a position to reduce the need for new or 
supplemental NEPA analyses when changed conditions require 
changes in resource management.253 This is one of the lessons 
manifest in the litigation over the NWFP.254 Second, federal ac-
tions that employ adaptive management may be in a better po-
sition to argue that mitigation measures incorporated in the 
federal action and put into effect through adaptive manage-
ment justify the decision not to prepare a full EIS (i.e., to miti-
gate to a finding of no significant impact, or FONSI).255 Our re-
view of adaptive management litigation bolsters this claim by 
the CEQ only in circumstances where there is an earlier, com-
prehensive EIS to which the Environmental Assessment 
tiers.256  
 
 250. Id. at 45. 
 251. The Supreme Court’s oft-repeated observation is that while “NEPA 
does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation[,] . . . its mandate to 
the agencies is essentially procedural.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also Stryker’s 
Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per cu-
riam) (stating that once an agency has complied with NEPA procedures, the 
courts do not question the choice of action the agency has taken).  
 252. Agencies must prepare the EIS prior to deciding which action to se-
lect, and there is no need for subsequent monitoring and assessment to follow 
up on the EIS after the agency action has been selected and implemented. See 
David R. Hodas, NEPA, Ecosystem Management and Environmental Account-
ing, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 185, 188 (2000) (describing NEPA’s lack of 
post-EIS review as inadequate to support ecosystem management). 
 253. See NEPA TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 47.  
 254. See supra text accompanying note 166. 
 255. See NEPA TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 48. 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 222–27. 
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Hence, whereas the traditional NEPA model provides no 
incentive to federal agencies (or the state, local, and private 
entities sponsoring the projects federal agencies fund or author-
ize) to incorporate adaptive management in the actions being 
evaluated under NEPA, the Task Force used the prospect of 
avoiding having to prepare a full or supplemental EIS as an in-
centive to do just that. Indeed, in 2007 the Forest Service pro-
posed rules to update its procedures for NEPA compliance with 
numerous references to adaptive management built around the 
provision that 
[a] proposed action or alternative(s) may include adaptive manage-
ment strategies allowing for adjustment of the action during imple-
mentation. If the adjustments to an action are clearly articulated and 
pre-specified in the description of the alternative and fully analyzed, 
then the action may be adjusted during implementation without the 
need for further analysis.257 
Similarly, in 2008 the DOI proposed revisions to its NEPA 
implementation rules directing that “[b]ureaus should use 
adaptive management as part of their decisionmaking 
processes, as appropriate, particularly in circumstances where 
long-term impacts may be uncertain and future monitoring will 
be needed to make necessary adjustments in subsequent im-
plementation decisions.”258  
Another theme of NEPA reformers consistent with the case 
law on adaptive management has been to encourage more at-
tention to large-scale or programmatic EISs.259 Early-stage 
analyses can be difficult to perform because activities may still 
be nebulous. But, early and broad evaluations can steer agen-
cies in more effective and environmentally benign directions.260 
They are the analyses most likely to actually help agency deci-
sionmakers. The bigger temporal and geographic scales 
representing the greatest agency successes in the adaptive 
management litigation bolster this general argument of NEPA 
reformers. Because adaptive management is expensive, agen-
cies should place their highest funding priorities on large-scale 
efforts, which are most likely to yield useful, incremental ad-
justments over time.261 
 
 257. National Environmental Policy Act Procedures, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,998, 
46,005 (Aug. 16, 2007). 
 258. Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 
1969, 73 Fed. Reg. 126, 135 (Jan. 2, 2008). 
 259. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 248, at 11–13. 
 260. See id. at 12. 
 261. See id. at 14.  
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Despite fundamentally different assumptions about know-
ledge and decisionmaking, adaptive management is compatible 
with NEPA. Adaptive management is well suited to the NEPA 
tiering that natural resources agencies already use adeptly. An 
added incentive for agency use of adaptive management in 
EISs is that it may raise the threshold for requiring a supple-
mental EIS should new information emerge. Agencies must be 
attentive to the obligation that mitigated FONSIs demonstrate 
that impacts will fall below the significance threshold. Adaptive 
management alone, without substantive triggers, may not 
shoulder the burden. 
3. Extending a/m-lite to Pollution Control 
The pollution-control side of environmental litigation has 
not directly addressed adaptive management. The strong “co-
operative federalism” structure of pollution-control law intro-
duces the complications of state implementation that go far 
beyond the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta example.262 Pollu-
tion control also involves far more regulation of private econom-
ic activity than does resource management.263 But the relative-
ly stronger emphasis on meeting substantive criteria, such as 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),264 in pollu-
tion-control law will increasingly provide some lessons for im-
plementing adaptive management. For example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld the EPA’s approval of a Texas State 
Implementation Plan (SIP), which the Clean Air Act requires to 
demonstrate that the state will be able to attain NAAQS.265 
The SIP at issue purported to demonstrate that the Houston-
Galveston area would comply with the NAAQS for ozone.266 
The state was able to devise control measures that would 
achieve ninety-four percent of the pollution reduction needed to 
attain the NAAQS.267 In order to extract the additional six per-
 
 262. See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Re-
sources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 207–29 (2005) (contrasting the ver-
sions of cooperative federalism in pollution control and resource management).  
 263. See Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the 
Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 663 (2008) 
(discussing the characteristic differences between pollution control and natu-
ral resources law). The ESA is a resource management statute that straddles 
the divide and does regulate some private activities directly. Id. at 684. 
 264. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409 (2006). 
 265. BCCA Appeal Grp. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 355 F.3d 817, 821–22 
(5th Cir. 2003). 
 266. Id. at 822–23. 
 267. Id. at 838. 
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cent reduction, the EPA accepted the SIP’s “enforceable com-
mitment to adopt and implement additional . . . controls.”268 
The SIP could not specify what those additional controls would 
be, but it did provide “a list of soon-to-be-available, cutting-edge 
technologies.”269 The court upheld the EPA determination un-
der the Chevron standard of review.270 The Texas SIP case il-
lustrates how pollution control benefits from large-scale plans 
that promise to meet substantive criteria through thousands of 
small steps. Texas benefited from the large scale in committing 
to additional reductions (six percent) without specifying the ex-
act sources of contribution to that goal. The court’s deferential 
standard of review afforded the EPA flexibility to approve the 
experiment of meeting the standard through as-yet-unavailable 
technology.271 This is a form of narrowing uncertainty over time 
that is widely viewed as an attribute of adaptive management. 
On the other hand, the EPA recently refused to extend its 
flexibility in proposing to disapprove a Texas SIP revision em-
ploying a “Flexible Permits” approach to meet the Clean Air 
Act’s new source review requirements for industrial sources of 
pollution.272 The Texas program would allow individual sources 
to exceed standards as long as they provided cumulative emis-
sions reductions on a case-by-case basis.273 The EPA’s proposed 
finding emphasized that the state program does not meet the 
statutory standards and fails to ensure accountability, com-
pliance, and monitoring.274 These are familiar criticisms of the 
a/m-lite plans reviewed in the natural resources litigation. 
The EPA recently restructured its Chesapeake Bay Pro-
gram (CBP) to emphasize adaptive management. The CBP cov-
ers a larger area than the Texas SIPs, or even the NWFP. In 
 
 268. Id. at 839–40. 
 269. Id. at 841. 
 270. Id. at 842.  
 271. Id. at 841.  
 272. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 74 Fed. Reg. 
48,480, 48,480 (Sept. 23, 2009). New source review provides for the “regulation 
of the modification and construction” of certain stationary sources of air pollu-
tion. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
 273. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
48,485–86.  
 274. See id. at 48,482. This is consistent with the Miccosukee Tribe rejec-
tion of adaptive, incremental improvement through best technology in lieu of 
strictly imposed water-quality based, storm-water effluent limitations for 
phosphorus in order to meet Clean Water Act substantive requirements. See 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, No. 04-21448, 2010 WL 
1506267, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2010).  
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response to a 2007 congressional mandate, the EPA revised its 
CBP around four basic components, one of which is adaptive 
management.275 In 2009, President Obama ordered the EPA to 
work with other federal agencies to implement adaptive man-
agement in the CBP.276 However, in contrast to the SIPs, the 
CBP has few enforceable criteria (but many quantitative goals) 
and its multistate dimension tends to create adaptive man-
agement plans focused primarily on the process of coordina-
tion.277 With diffuse responsibility, an emphasis on monitoring 
and study, and few interim targets, the new CBP has already 
received criticism as a helpless giant.278 Nonetheless, we expect 
increased use of adaptive management in adjusting water qual-
ity standards and total maximum daily loads of pollutants for 
impaired bodies of water, such as the Chesapeake Bay. 
4. Public and Industry Buy-In 
The courts are not the only institution reviewing adaptive 
management. Private regulated interests have expressed con-
cerns about the capacity of adaptive management to add con-
tinually to the conditions imposed by resource development au-
thorizations without the security of finality. The Army Corps, 
for example, heard this complaint as it developed adaptive 
management provisions in the new wetlands compensatory 
mitigation rule: 
 
 275. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CBP/TRS-292-08, STRENGTHENING THE 
MANAGEMENT, COORDINATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CHESAPEAKE 
BAY PROGRAM, at ii–iii (2008) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM], avail-
able at http://cap.chesapeakebay.net/docs/EPA_Chesapeake_Bay_CAP.pdf. 
 276. Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration, Exec. Order No. 13,508, 
74 Fed. Reg. 23,099, 23,101–03 (May 15, 2009) (directing the EPA in section 
301(b) to draft pollution-control strategies that are “based on sound science 
and reflect adaptive management principles” and noting in section 801 that 
the DOI is to use “adaptive management to plan, monitor, evaluate, and ad-
just environmental management actions”). 
 277. See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, supra note 275, at 26 (listing 
quantitative goals with adaptive management strategies); id. at 34 (providing 
the CBP management system diagram illustrating a detailed procedural 
method). 
 278. See Rena Steinzor & Shana Campbell Jones, Reauthorizing the Ches-
apeake Bay Program: Exchanging Promises for Results 1 (Ctr. for Progressive 
Reform, Working Paper No. 903, 2009). The detailed management system is 
reminiscent of the ecosystem management model skewered by Professor 
Houck for lack of substance and neglect of lawmaking. See Oliver Houck, On 
the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 
937–39 (1997) (“Nothing better illustrates the potential benefit and reach of 
ecosystem management, and its latent danger, than the Inner Columbia Basin 
story . . . .”). 
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One commenter suggested that if a permittee has made a “good faith 
effort” to meet performance standards, no additional compensatory 
mitigation requirements should be imposed other than an extension 
of the monitoring period. Several commenters said that requiring 
adaptive management efforts beyond what is currently required as 
remediation or contingency actions will impose additional financial 
and resource burdens on mitigation providers.279 
The agency’s response was a Solomonic mixed bag. On the 
one hand, the Army Corps acknowledged the reality that “there 
may be additional costs associated with an adaptive manage-
ment approach, but we believe that such an approach is neces-
sary to achieve compensatory mitigation project objectives, or 
to provide comparable or superior ecological benefits.”280 Yet, 
the agency did clarify that the scope of adaptive management is 
not boundless, noting that “adaptive management does not re-
quire anticipation of all potential challenges, since that would 
be impossible to accomplish.”281 This is unlikely to be of comfort 
to regulated interests, however, as it leaves much to the details 
of the adaptive management plan and subsequent implementa-
tion. As we conclude from our case law evaluation, courts may 
find this approach too open-ended if the plan is not sufficiently 
detailed to assure substantive compliance.  
Just as regulated interests are concerned that adaptive 
management will lead to runaway land management burdens, 
environmental protection interests are concerned that it will 
lead to closed-door resource development approvals. For exam-
ple, as FWS brought adaptive management on line for the HCP 
permit program under the ESA,282 environmentalists com-
plained about inadequate access to meaningful public partici-
pation in the HCP negotiation process and the lack of an ongo-
ing public role in the implementation of adaptive management 
over the life of the HCP permit.283 By the late 1990s, environ-
mental groups had begun to accuse the HCP of making deci-
 
 279. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 19,594, 19,647 (Apr. 10, 2008). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 19,620. 
 282. See supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text. 
 283. See, e.g., LAURA C. HOOD, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION 
PLANNING UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, at vi–xiii (1998) (presenting 
a pessimistic assessment of the HCP program); John Kostyack, Surprise!, 15 
ENVTL. F., Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 19, 19–24 (presenting an extensive criticism of 
the HCP program from the perspective of an attorney for the National Wildlife 
Federation); cf. Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safe-
ty Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94, 95–96 
(2001) (describing criticism from other organizations).  
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sions without following “biological standards” and to demand 
more public participation as a result.284 For example, in 1999 
the Defenders of Wildlife issued a blistering critique of the HCP 
program, complaining that, among other things,  
[c]itizens from various stakeholder groups have no formal role in the 
HCP process except through the public comment period and . . . gen-
erally have not had a seat at the negotiating table in many major re-
cent negotiations despite the fact that conservationists (in addition to 
FWS) represent the public’s interest in protecting endangered spe-
cies.285 
Since then, some HCPs have been found by courts to con-
tain robust adaptive management provisions that detail a com-
prehensive monitoring and adjustment protocol and specify the 
kinds of events and responses for which adjustments will be 
made.286 FWS has also joined other state and federal agencies 
to develop detailed technical guidance for monitoring protocols 
to assist adaptive management in large-scale HCPs.287 Yet, 
public participation of the kind demanded has yet to be made a 
component of HCP adaptive management implementation. The 
pressure for more public input on this and other aspects of HCP 
 
 284. See, e.g., HOOD, supra note 283, at 59–61, 80–81 (summarizing the De-
fenders of Wildlife’s critique of the HCP program). 
 285. Id. at 41; see also Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in 
the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 707, 712–15 (1999) (examining the growing tension between the HCP and 
other ESA reform programs and public participation values). 
 286. For an example, see Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, 202 F. Supp. 2d 594 (W.D. Tex. 2002). This case involved a 
dispute between plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity environmental group 
and defendant-intervener La Cantera, a commercial development company, 
regarding 750 acres of land in Bexar County, Texas. Id. at 597. The FWS is-
sued an Incidental Take Permit to La Cantera, and the plaintiff challenged 
virtually every aspect of the permit, including the adequacy of the adaptive 
management provisions, but lost on every claim notwithstanding the court’s 
expressed aversion to allowing development in habitat of endangered species. 
The court’s discussion of the adaptive management provisions emphasized the 
comprehensive and detailed nature of the monitoring and response protocols. 
See id. at 616. Seven years later, after reviewing an annual report the court 
required to be filed each year describing management actions under the per-
mit, the court issued an order congratulating the permittee and agency “for 
coming to this positive result and a fine example of corporate citizenship.” Ctr. 
for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. SA-01-CA-1139-FB 
(W.D. Tex, May 5, 2009) (order acknowledging annual report on file with au-
thor). In the interest of full disclosure, Professor Ruhl served as a consultant 
to the HCP applicant in the case. 
 287. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., DESIGNING MONITORING 
PROGRAMS IN AN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT FOR REGIONAL MULTIPLE 
SPECIES CONSERVATION PLANS 10–40 (2004), available at http://www.dfg.ca 
.gov/habcon/nccp/publications.html. 
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permits thus continues to build.288 We expect similar issues to 
develop in other permitting and approval programs using adap-
tive management.289 
Neither the regulated industry certainty nor the public 
participation concern has surfaced in claims brought against 
adaptive management in the courts to date, and no court has 
expressed concern in either respect sua sponte. This probably is 
due more to the hybrid nature of a/m-lite than it is to the un-
derlying justifications for the respective concerns. Agencies 
practicing a/m-lite do so against the context of conventional 
natural resources management laws, which tend not to specify 
conditions for regulated party certainty and which prescribe 
fairly minimal public participation in the form of notice and 
comment. So long as an agency satisfies the black-letter re-
quirements of statutes in these respects, courts are unlikely to 
nullify use of a/m-lite on these grounds. By the same token, 
however, the black-letter law also constrains how far agencies 
can go with a/m-lite, as truly iterative “learning while doing” 
may at some point run afoul of permitting procedures and cri-
teria, as well as the demands of public notice and comment. 
Our message to agencies in this respect is not to take the ab-
sence of these concerns registering in the case law to date as 
evidence that there is no limit to how far agencies can imple-
ment a/m-lite without regard to regulated industry and public 
interests. Stretch it too far in either respect and the lawsuits 
are sure to come.  
B. LESSONS FOR CONGRESS 
Even if agencies follow the lessons we have extracted from 
the existing adaptive management case law, which we believe 
would reduce adverse judicial reaction, the most they could 
hope for is to be able to implement a disciplined form of a/m-
lite. The courts cannot provide the funding necessary to sup-
port true “learning while doing,” and neither can they supply 
more authority or clearer standards than exist in existing stat-
utory text. Only Congress can let agencies break out of the a/m-
lite mold without fear of public, industry, and judicial push-
 
 288. For a recent evaluation of the HCP program, including a proposal for 
more public participation, see David Dana, Reforming Section 10 and the Hab-
itat Conservation Program 12–17 (Nw. Univ. School of Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 09-44), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1519515. 
 289. For example, the public participation issue confronted the NEPA Task 
Force as well. See NEPA TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 51. 
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back. Of course, Congress is not bound to follow the lead the 
courts have given agencies, but we believe Congress would be 
well advised to codify judicial guideposts for determining when 
the practical demands on adaptive management warrant de-
parture from the pristine theory and when, on the other hand, 
the agencies have given themselves too long a leash.  
On the funding question, it is time for Congress to consider 
supporting adaptive management plans through the purchase 
of annuities that would ensure a steady stream of subsequent 
funding for the development of management experiments, mon-
itoring, and revision.290 Current appropriation practice, which 
provides most funding for the first stage of planning and not for 
the subsequent iterations, is inadequate to reap significant 
benefits from adaptive management. Prior efforts, most notably 
through the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Plan-
ning Act of 1974,291 failed in disciplining Congress to make 
strategic investments in resource management.292 The 1974 
statute established an elaborate planning regime which viewed 
forests as capital assets requiring reliable future funding to 
maintain their value. It required an annual “Statement of Rea-
sons” from the President explaining deviations of proposed 
budgets from the needed funds projected in long-term plans, 
but both branches ignored the well-intentioned legislation.293 
Creating endowments or purchasing annuities are more con-
crete assurances of follow-through and deserve further explora-
tion. This would be a timely project as Congress considers cli-
mate change legislation that may provide new revenues from 
sales of emission allowances.294 In the absence of congressional 
 
 290. Examples abound of agencies unable to afford the monitoring de-
scribed in adaptive plans. A common scenario is national forests unable to 
fund the monitoring of indicator species populations identified in forest plans. 
See, e.g., Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 999–1001, 1000 n.12 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1190–97 (10th Cir. 
2006); Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1, 3–8 (11th Cir. 1999); Inland Empire 
Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 763–65 (9th Cir. 1996); 
see also W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-05-189-E-BLW, 
2006 WL 292010, at *4–8 (D. Idaho 2006) (identifying inadequate funding for 
the Forest Service to apply forest plan standards relating to grazing suitability 
using on-the-ground studies). 
 291. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1613 (2006). 
 292. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 919–20 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980); GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND 
RESOURCES LAW 690 (6th ed. 2007).  
 293. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 292, at 690. 
 294. See Glicksman, supra note 4, at 873. The leading bills in both the House 
and Senate provide substantial funding for natural resource conservation. 
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action, agencies should at least use NEPA to disclose funding 
needs for adaptive management and the environmental effects 
that would result from failure to find the means for implemen-
tation of monitoring, mitigation, or adjustment.295 
In addition to reforming the appropriations process, Con-
gress could substantially improve the practice of adaptive man-
agement in natural resource administration. It is possible to es-
tablish clearer standards to ensure that an agency purporting 
to employ adaptive management actually does an adequate job. 
Congress should explicitly require adaptive management plans 
to (1) clearly articulate measurable goals, (2) identify testable 
hypotheses (or some other method of structured learning from 
conceptual models), and (3) state exactly what criteria should 
apply in evaluating the management experiments. These re-
quirements would address the vast majority of nonbudgetary 
problems with a/m-lite. With explicit learning goals and estab-
lished measures of success, agencies could retain discretion to 
adjust their decisions while offering far greater assurances to 
stakeholders. 
Assuring future funding and requiring that the experimen-
tal elements of adaptive management be more precisely defined 
would address both the disparities we noted at the beginning of 
Part II.C. of this Article. These elements would provide judi-
cially enforceable benchmarks for oversight of natural re-
sources planning and management. They would also rein in the 
a/m-lite practices that currently serve as open-ended contin-
gency planning by ensuring that all adaptive management 
plans get the benefit of the scientific method to guide future 
iterations. In narrowing the disparities, they would wring more 
benefits from adaptive management by reducing uncertainty as 
plans move forward.296 True, adaptive management in practice 
would remain a somewhat grotesque hybrid of conservation pol-
icy’s complexity theory and modern administrative law’s ap-
proach to pluralism and finality. But it would likely achieve 
more of the benefits we wish to extract from ecosystems with 
less rancor.  
 
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009); Amer-
ican Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 295. See Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, supra note 227, at 4 (rec-
ommending disclosure of these needs and effects relating to mitigation); id. at 
7 (citing U.S. Army NEPA regulations assuring effective mitigation by barring 
actions until mitigation measures are fully funded or until lack of funding is 
addressed in the NEPA analysis, 32 C.F.R. § 651.15(a)(5)(d)). 
 296. Doremus, supra note 1, at 569.  
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The federal government has noted that “[c]limate change 
creates new situations of added complexity for which an adap-
tive management approach may be the only way to take man-
agement action today while allowing for increased understand-
ing and refinement tomorrow.”297 Commentators agree, and 
there are currently no viable alternative approaches to respond 
to the increased uncertainties surrounding conservation.298 
Therefore, the stakes are high for public agencies to refine their 
approach to adaptive management in light of the lessons from 
the first generation of litigation. 
  CONCLUSION   
Our review of the first generation of adaptive management 
litigation provides more than an analysis of how the law ap-
plies or the reaction of the judiciary. It also opens a window in-
to the actual practices that agencies have justified under the 
title adaptive management. Not surprisingly, implementation 
fails to mirror the finely wrought theory of adaptive manage-
ment. The litigation reflects the practical and political com-
promises agencies make, whether applying adaptive manage-
ment or any other model of natural resources management 
decisionmaking. It highlights how rarely real learning and re-
duced uncertainly result, and how haphazardly they feed back 
into agency programs. But it also points the way toward im-
proved implementation and legislative reform. 
The next round of lawsuits over adaptive management will 
likely focus on how well the procedures developed in large-scale 
plans have fulfilled their promise. Only the NWFP is old 
enough to have experienced much second-generation litigation. 
However, agencies should prepare by being careful about what 
they promise. The temptation to defer difficult and costly anal-
ysis, or punt on politically controversial decisions, may create 
problems for agencies down the line. What might have been a 
routine implementation project may explode into an expensive, 
complex task if the initial a/m-lite failed to commit to a course 
of action, applied only vague criteria for evaluating actions, or 
deferred substantial analysis of site-specific effects.  
 
 297. JILL S. BARON ET AL., PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS 
FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 25 (Susan Herrod Ju-
lius & Jordan M. West eds., 2008), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/ 
Library/sap/sap4-4/final-report/#finalreport. 
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One must wonder, however, about how much time we have 
for lessons to come out of the second generation of adaptive 
management litigation. The pressure on Congress, agencies, 
the courts, and all natural resources policy stakeholders to fur-
ther refine, implement, and work within a regime of adaptive 
management is not about to let up. There is widespread agree-
ment, for example, that the effects of climate change on natural 
resources will be complex, dynamic, nonlinear, and frequently 
unpredictable over anything but short time frames, all of which 
are conditions that demand adaptive management responses.299 
Yet, although the first generation of litigation seems to have 
laid down some important foundational lessons for this effort, 
doing so took a span of roughly fifteen years. Adaptive man-
agement litigation now risks getting down in the weeds, so to 
speak, and must avoid letting the perfect be the enemy of the 
good at a time when decisive action is needed. Our assessment 
of adaptive management in the courts suggests there is a good 
model in place. If agencies follow it and courts enforce it faith-
fully, it may serve as a potent component of climate change pol-
icy notwithstanding its flaws. 
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